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Introduction1
Climate warming is now considered as a clear and present danger2. Over the
past 150 years, temperature has increased by almost 0.8 ºC globally (and by
about 1 ºC in Europe). According to the general consensus, the global tempera-
ture rise must be held to not more than 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels,
otherwise there will be most probably severe and irreversible consequences for
all of us on this planet and costs of adaptation will escalate3.
Limiting temperature rise to not more than 2°C requires a reduction in global
greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions (mainly due to human activities) of at least
50% of 1990 levels by 2050 (at best 80%-95% by 2050). It also requires devel-
oped countries (together) to have their GHG emissions to peak before 2020.
Finally, scientific studies even require now a stabilization of atmospheric con-
centration of GHG at a significantly lower level than previously recommended,
i.e. 350 ppmv CO2 equivalent instead of 450 ppmv4.
In that general context, 2009 was a pivotal year for the EU climate policy. The
bright sight: the EU adopted the climate package, which is widely considered as
the most important legislative package of the 2004-2009 legislature5. The flip
side: after much hype, the Copenhagen conference produced (without the par-
ticipation of the EU to its elaboration) a very unsatisfactory agreement for the
replacement of the Kyoto protocol after 2012. The pill was particularly bitter
for the EU which had sought for many years to take the international leadership
in the fight against global warming. It is thus now a good period to try to make
a global assessment of the EU policy regarding climate warming.
Such a global assessment is however complicated to make. Indeed, the EU policy
regarding climate warming goes beyond the climate package. Other instruments
concern, without being exhaustive, energy efficiency; some aspects of transport;
state aid; a SET-Plan whose aim consists of accelerating innovation of energy
technologies to match the double challenge of climate change mitigation and
adaptation. One could also take into consideration other things, like the third
1. Franklin Dehousse is professor at the University of Liège and judge at the General Court of the Euro-
pean Union. Tania Zgajewski is Director of HERA. This comment does not in any way represent a posi-
tion of the institutions to which they belong. Developments have been covered until 1st June 2010.
2. See IPCC, Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007. See
however R. CARTER et alii, The Stern review: a dual critique, 7 World Economics, 2006, pp. 165-232.
3. For a reminder concerning climate studies and the development of international cooperation about cli-
mate, see F. DEHOUSSE and T. ZGAJEWSKI, Climate change: what are the implications for the interna-
tional system and the European Union?, Studia Diplomatica, 2008/1, pp. 3-114.
4. See the Copenhagen diagnosis (www.copenhagendiagnosis.com) and the latest Tyndall perspectives
(http://assets.panda.org/downloads/plugin_tp_final_report.pdf).
5. OJ 2009, L 140.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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energy internal market package (also called the “third energy package”)
adopted in 2009, but the latter will not be dealt here.
Firstly, it is necessary to describe very briefly the threat of climate change for
Europe (§ 1) as well as the birth and objective of the EU climate and energy
package (§ 2). Then, a description of the different components of this package
will be given: the EU emission trading scheme (ETS) (§ 3), the obligations of the
non-ETS sectors (§ 4), the 20% renewable energy objective (§ 5), the promotion
of carbon capture and storage (§ 6), the framework about environmental subsi-
dies (§ 7). Thirdly, an examination of the other legislations that the EU climate
policy encompasses will be conducted: energy efficiency (§ 8), the GHG emis-
sions of cars (§ 9), and the GHG emissions of fuels (§ 10), and the SET-plan
(§ 11) Finally, a word will be said about adaptation (§ 12), before examining the
international aspects of the EU actions after Copenhagen (§ 13).7
1. What are the Climate Threats for Europe?
A lot of studies have been made about the potential impact of climate change on
Europe. Taken globally, they reflect that the climate science remains an uncer-
tain one. There are some huge variations between anticipations. However, all of
them point to the same direction, relying sometimes on recent evolutions6.
According to the assessment provided by the EEA in June 20107, “the global
(land and ocean) average temperature increase between 1850 and 2009 was
0.74°C using combined Hadley centre and CRU datasets compared to the 1850-
1899 period average temperature and 0.84°C using GISS dataset compared to
the 1880-1899 period average temperature. All used temperature records show
the 2000s decade (2000-2009) was the warmest decade. The rate of global aver-
age temperature change has increased from around 0.06°C per decade over last
100 years, to 0.16-0.20°C in last decade.”
Europe has felt this evolution quite stronly. It “warmed more than the global
average. The annual average temperature for the European land area up to 2009
was 1.3°C above 1850-1899 average temperature, and for the combined land
and ocean area 1°C above. Considering the land area, nine out of the last 12
years were among the warmest years since 1850. High-temperature extremes
like hot days, tropical nights, and heat waves have become more frequent, while
low-temperature extremes (e.g. cold spells, frost days) have become less frequent
in Europe. The average length of summer heat waves over Western Europe dou-
bled over the period 1850 to 2009 and the frequency of hot days almost tri-
pled.”
What does all this tell us about the future? In synthesis, “the annual average
temperature in Europe is projected to rise in this century with the largest warm-
ing over eastern and northern Europe in winter, and over Southern Europe in
summer. High temperature events across Europe including temperature
extremes such as heat waves are projected to become more frequent, intense and
longer this century, whereas winter temperature variability and the number of
cold and frost extremes are projected to decrease further. According to the pro-
jections, the most affected European regions are going to be the Iberian and the
Apennine Peninsula and south-eastern Europe.”
6. See EEA, Impacts of Europe's changing climate — 2008 indicator-based assessment, 2008, and also the
interesting synthesis of A. Behrens, A. Georgiev and M. Carraro, The future impact of climate change
across Europe, CEPS, 2010.
7. EEA, Global and European temperature – Assessment published, June 2010.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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The variability of the weather will consequently increase in general. It will likely
bring more precipitation floods and droughts. Floods will provoke more risks in
the North, droughts in the South, but basically it will be worse in the South,
where the rise of temperature extremes will be heavily felt. River floods, which
have already increased, could become worse, especially in Central Europe and
the British Isles. In a longer term, a simple rise of 0,5 m of the sea could jeop-
ardize many important coastal cities in Western Europe. The temperature rise
will also create problems of water scarcity, more particularly in the Mediterra-
nean countries. Water availability might fall by 20-30% under a +2°C scenario
and by 40-50% under a +4°C scenario. This will have important consequences:
on the water quality, on households and many economic activities, on human
health. Some argue nevertheless that desalination could have a legitimate role to
play in long-term water management but the process of turning salty water into
drinking water remains for the moment energy intensive and expensive. The
transport of such water is also costly.
In the domain of the exploitation of natural resources, changes in agriculture
will be contrasted, generally positive in the North, and negative in the South.
The impact of the previous elements (temperature extremes, droughts and
floods) will of course amplify this. The crop yields in forestry will also diminish,
except maybe in Northern Europe. Even there, however, the combination of
temperature rise and extreme weather accidents could even annihilate the posi-
tive consequences of a warmer climate in the most favored zones. The present
degradation of biodiversity will also increase (disappearance of some species
and displacement of others).
With regard to ecosystems and biodiversity, plant and animal species risk extinc-
tion if increases in global temperature exceed 1.5-2.5°C. This will affect econo-
mies and societies.
In the field of energy, there remains a lot of uncertainty surrounding the evolu-
tion of global energy demand. On one side, the needs for heating will certainly
diminish (especially in the North). On the other side, the needs for summer cool-
ing will increase (especially in the South). The North areas will benefit from
increased precipitation, melting glaciers and thus run-off water. Consequently,
hydropower production there could increase by 5% or more. On the other
hand, the Mediterranean and Central Europe will suffer from a decrease in
hydropower (around 25% in 2050), limiting as a result the electricity produc-
tion. Increased risks of storms and floods may also threaten energy infrastruc-
ture. All these elements plead for diversification of energy sources and the devel-
opment of renewable energy.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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So Europe will not be spared and, as indicated in the introduction, Europe has
already warmed faster than the global temperature. In the European Union, cli-
mate change will most likely have very different impacts in the North and the
South of Europe. These impacts could as a matter of fact increase very strongly
this divide. However, the North should not feel protected. These evolutions
could provoke conflicts and migrations. In other words, if there may be some
positive aspects of global warming, these are by far exceeded by negative
impacts.11
2. The Climate and Energy Package Objective: 
30% Reductionof the EU Greenhouse Gases 
Emissions by 2020... Maybe
2.1. The March 2007 European Council
In January 2007, the European Commission issued a communication8 addressed
to the European Council. The key points were the following ones. Global warm-
ing must remain limited to no more than 2°C above the pre-industrial tempera-
ture. To stay within this limit, the world needs to cut greenhouse gas emissions
by as much as 50% of 1990 levels by 2050. As an essential step towards this
long-term reduction, it was proposed that the EU pursues in the context of inter-
national negotiations the objective of 30% reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions by developed countries by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels) under a new
global climate change agreement. The EU is responsible for 14% of worldwide
emissions of greenhouse gases. The EU had to take a firm independent commit-
ment to achieve at least a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas by 2020, by the EU
ETS and by other climate change policies and actions in the context of the
energy policy. In addition, action by developing countries will be also essential,
since their emissions are projected to overtake those from developed countries
by 2020. For this reason, it was estimated that developing countries should start
to slow the rate of growth in their emissions as soon as possible and then reduce
their emissions in absolute terms from 2020-2025 onwards. Finally, it is neces-
sary to halt tropical deforestation completely within the next decades and then
reverse it through afforestation or reforestation schemes. Deforestation cur-
rently contributes around 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions.
In March 2007, on this basis, the European Council adopted a commitment to
reduce European GHG emissions by at least 20% by 2020 compared with 1990
levels and concluded that this reduction target would be increased to 30% pro-
vided that other industrialized countries commit themselves to comparable
emission reductions in the context of an international agreement.
The European Council also admitted the impossibility to meet this new objective
of 20% GHG emission reduction by 2020 without an integrated approach of
the climate and energy policies since energy production and use are the main
sources of GHG emissions. With this in mind, it adopted the energy action plan
8. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Limiting global climate change to 2°C.
The way ahead for 2020 and beyond – [COM (2007) 2].THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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for 2007-2009 which fixed notably an objective of saving 20% of the EU’s
energy consumption compared to projections for 2020; a binding target of 20%
share of renewable energies in overall EU energy consumption by 2020; and a
binding target to achieve at least 10% of consumption for biofuels by each
Member State. It called for a European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-
Plan) and for a review of the Community guidelines on State aid for environ-
mental protection and other relevant Community instruments which can pro-
vides incentives to make them more supportive of the Community’s energy and
climate change objectives. The need to develop clean fossil fuel technologies was
also underlined, in particular CCS for which a specific technical, economic and
regulatory framework had to be developed and for which a specific mechanism
had to be established in view to stimulate the construction and operation of up
to 12 CO2 CCS demonstration projects by 2015. The strengthening and exten-
sion of global carbon markets was also stressed.
The next step was to translate these objectives into action. A European Commis-
sion green paper on “adapting to climate change in Europe – options for EU
action” was presented mid-20079. At the beginning of 2008, a package of con-
crete legislative proposals10 was tabled. It was based on five key principles11: the
targets must be met, the effort required by the various Member States must be
fair, the costs must be minimised, the EU must drive on beyond 2020 to make
even deeper cuts in greenhouse gases to meet the target of halving global emis-
sions by 2050 and the EU must do everything possible to promote a comprehen-
sive international climate agreement.
It is important to underline that the Commission’s evaluation of the package’s
costs was quite positive. It went from 2,2% GDP (for Bulgaria) to 0,1% GDP
(for Cyprus), with an average of 0,58% for the EU as a whole12. This evaluation
seems more or less in line with the global outline of the Stern review on the
economics of climate change13. The Stern review’s most important evaluation
concerned the costs to stabilize at 500ppm. This evaluation was between –1,0%
and + 3,5% GDP, with an average of + 1% GDP, which was widely quoted. This
has however been described as far too positive14.
9. COM (2007) 354 final, completed by a Commission staff working document SEC (2007) 849.
10. COM (2008) 16; COM (2008) 17; COM (2008) 18; and COM (2008) 19.
11. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – 20 20 by 2020 – Europe's climate
change opportunity, COM(2008) 30, 23 January 2008.
12. SEC (2008) 85, vol. II, p. 42.
13. http://www.webcitation.org/5nCeyEYJr. (accessed August 17, 2010).
14. See for example HELM, Climate-change policy: why has so little been achieved?, in D. HELM AND
C. HEPBURN eds., The economics and politics of climate change, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009, pp. 3-35,
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After long and difficult negotiations between the EU institutions, the package of
legislative proposals was definitively approved in April 2009. It is usually called
the “EU climate and energy package” and Member States got 18 months to
transpose it into national law. In parallel to this energy/climate package, revised
guidelines on state aid for environmental protection and a SET-plan were also
adopted. These instruments complement the climate and energy package.
2.2. The EU climate and energy package
The EU climate and energy package15 is composed of four instruments: (1) a
Directive 2009/29/EC on the ETS post-201216; (2) a Decision No 406/2009/EC
on the effort of Member States to reduce their GHG emissions in non-ETS sec-
tors; (3) a Directive 2009/28/EC promoting the use of energy from renewable
energy sources17; a Directive 2009/31/EC organizing a legal framework on car-
bon capture and storage.
Two important remarks must be made however before describing its content.
Firstly, the climate and energy package imposes henceforth that the GHG emis-
sion reductions have to be made by comparison with the 2005 levels and not
anymore by comparison with the 1990 levels.18 The consequence of this change
is important because it means that the EU independent commitment to reduce
by 2020 the overall EU GHG emissions by 20% (compared to 1990 levels) cor-
responds in reality to a reduction of 14% (compared to 2005 levels). Secondly,
this 14% reduction (compared to 2005 levels) is divided between the ETS and
non-ETS sectors that the climate and energy package distinguishes: a 10%
reduction target for the non-ETS sectors by 2020 (from 2005 levels) and a 21%
reduction target for the ETS sectors by 2020 (from 2005 levels). The target for
the ETS is larger because the Commission has deemed it cheaper to reduce emis-
sions in the electricity sector than in other sectors.
15. OJ 5.06.2009, L 140, pp. 16 to 148.
16. The Directive 2009/29/EC amends Directive 2003/87/EC which establishes a scheme for greenhouse
gas emission allowance trading within the Community for the period prior to 2012.
17. The Directive 2009/28/EC amends and repeals Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC.
18. The justification given for such a change is that the data for 2005 are more reliable and more easily
available than those for 1990.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
14
These various EU targets can be presented in the following schematic way:
(Source: European Commission, MEMO/08/34)
2.3. The debate about moving to a 30% emissions 
reduction
After the failure of the Copenhagen conference to reach the goal of a binding
international agreement on a second commitment period to tackle climate
change, the Commission had to assess the situation. In that perspective, in May
2010, it presented a communication with a double objective: analysing the
options to move beyond 20% GHG emissions reduction and assessing the risk
of carbon leakage in the context of the revised EU ETS directive19. According to
this document, the context had changed deeply since 2008 (the most important
factor being the economic impact of the financial crisis).
Because of this change of context, the costs of meeting the 20% GHG reduction
target by 2020 has fallen from 70 Bn € to 48 Bn € per year. The additional costs
of moving to a 30% reduction target are estimated at 33 Bn € per year, or an
additional 0,2% of GDP. The cost-effective split between efforts in the ETS and
non ETS sectors is also estimated largely the same in the case of moving to a
30% target. The ETS cap would be 34% rather than the current 21% while the
overall target for non-ETS sectors would be 16% rather than the current 10%.
The incremental impact of carbon leakage is considered limited, provided that
19. COM (2010) 265, accompanied by a Commission’s staff working document SEC (2010) 650.
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free allocation of allowances and access to international credits remained in
place. The Commission indicates however that, if uncertainties remain around
the implementation of the Copenhagen Accord, pledges, additional steps could
be taken to address the increased risk of carbon leakage.
The European Council of June 2010 took note of this communication. It invited
the Commission to undertake further analyses, including consequences for each
Member State. Germany, France and the UK took a rather favourable posi-
tion20. Other countries, like Italy or most Eastern countries, were less favoura-
ble21.
20. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/08538a04-8f78-11df-8df0-00144feab49a.html. (accessed August 16,
2010).
21. http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eastern-europe-struggling-meet-eu-climate-targets-news-
496400 (accessed August 16, 2010).17
3. The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)
The European greenhouse gas Emissions Trading Scheme (hereafter “EU ETS”)
is considered as the main tool to reduce GHG emissions in the European Union.
The EU ETS was established by Directive 2003/87/EC22. It began operating on
1st January 2005. This system is meant to allow the EU to comply with its com-
mitments under the Kyoto Protocol at the lowest cost. At present, it is the largest
one of its kind in the world. Thanks to it, carbon dioxide emissions are hence-
forth a tradable commodity in the EU. They can be bought and sold in exactly
the same way as any of the thousands of products traded on world markets
every day.
The basic idea which underlies the ETS is fairly simple. A limit or “cap” is
placed on the amount of CO2 that companies can emit every year. At present,
about 12 500 industrial installations are covered by the ETS and each has been
awarded an annual quota of CO2 emission units. One unit or “allowance”
equals one tonne of CO2. An installation that emits more gases than it has allow-
ances has two options: either to pay a hefty fine or to buy extra allowances on
the market (from installations which manage to emit less than their allowances).
The regime foreseen by Directive 2003/87/EC has been strengthened, expanded
and improved by the climate and energy package. Directive 2003/87/EC has
been revised in order to achieve greater emission reductions by Directive 2009/
29/EC which introduces some essential changes23. The scope of covered activi-
ties and covered greenhouse gases is broadened. The national ceilings are
replaced by an EU ceiling. Auctioning of the allocations becomes the principle,
and free allocations a slowly dying exception. The use of CDM and JI has been
clarified. The new regime will be operational as from 2013.
3.1. The regime of the EU ETS until the end of 2012
3.1.1. The trading periods
The current EU ETS provides for two trading periods. The first trading period
ran from 1 January 2005 until 31 December 2007. During this first trading
period, the objective was to gather operational experience, to “learn by doing”.
The second trading period started on 1 January 2008 and is running until 2012
22. OJ 2003, L 275/32-46.
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(it thereby coincides with the commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol).
This second period implements the lessons of the first trading period.
3.1.2. The scope of application
Not all the six greenhouse gases of the Kyoto Protocol are concerned. Only
CO2, according to Annex I of the Directive 2003/87/EC, is subject to EU ETS.
Not all companies in the EU24 participate. The scope of application of the EU
ETS is limited to installations emitting CO2 in one of the four broad sectors
listed in Annex I of Directive 2003/87/EC. The four sectors are: energy activities
(such as coke ovens), the production and processing of ferrous metals (iron and
steel), mineral industry (cement, glass, pottery and bricks) and other activities
(pulp and paper production). For most of these activities, there are certain
threshold values so that only the largest installations are included.
The current EU ETS excludes thus sectors such as road transport; some indus-
trial sectors; international maritime emissions; and domestic emissions which
are included in the scope of the Kyoto Protocol. It also excludes airlines, outside
the Kyoto system, until 2012.
However, since 2008, a Member State may include additional activities and
gases not listed in the EU ETS, provided it is approved by the European Com-
mission which can, at the same time, authorise the issue of additional allow-
ances and may authorise other Member States to include such additional activ-
ities and gases.25
3.1.3. The national allocation plans
Above all, it is important to distinguish two different notions in the cap-and
trade scheme: the cap and the method of allocation. The “cap” represents the
“system constraint” of the trading scheme. It is the total number of allowances
that are created to be used by emissions sources that are covered by the scheme.
In a closed trading scheme (that is, one that is not linked to another trading
scheme), the cap represents the maximum emissions allowed from covered
sources. In contrast, the “method of allocation” refers to the way the total
24. It should be noted that the EU ETS has been extended to three members of the European Economic
Area – Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. See Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 146/2007 of 26
October 2007.
25. Art. 24, § 1 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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number of allowances is distributed. This may be by sale or auction or via some
method of free allocation.
The present EU ETS is characterized by a decentralized structure. The cap-set-
ting and the method of allocation of allowances to the installations are decided
at national level. More concretely, this means that each Member State is
required to draw up a national allocation plan (NAP), to be approved by the
European Commission26, for each trading period. In each NAP, the country
determines the cap (the total quantity of allowances that it intends to allocate)
and the method to allocate these allowances to the installations on its territory.
This way of doing implies that the total amount of allowances in the EU ETS
results from the sum of the allocated allowances by the national governments.
There lied an ambiguity that was finally submitted to the judicial authorities
after the Commission tried to limit the overall volume of allowances after the
price crash of the first period27.
As far as the method of allocation is concerned, all Member States have prima-
rily chosen to allocate allowances by using the grandfathering method: allow-
ances are allocated for free on the basis of the historic emissions levels of instal-
lations. The auctioning method allowed by Directive 2003/87/EC up to 5% and
10% in respectively the first and second period was very little used.
3.1.4. The use of CDM and JI credits
To increase the cost-effectiveness of achieving GHG emission reductions, the EU
ETS has been linked, via Directive 2004/101/EC28, with two flexible mecha-
nisms under the Kyoto Protocol29. As a result, installations covered by the ETS
are allowed to use credits generated by emission-saving projects carried out in
third countries under either the Joint Implementation (JI) or the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM). Credits from JI projects are known as Emission
Reduction Units (ERUs) while those from CDM projects are called Certified
Emission Reductions (CERs).
Directive 2004/101/EC also details rules on the use of such credits. On the one
hand, in exchange for one CER or ERU held by an operator, the Member State
must issue and immediately surrender one EU allowance. The use of the CERs
26. The NAPs are assessed by the European Commission on the basis of 12 criteria indicated in Annex III
of Directive 2003/87/EC.
27. See § 3.1.7.
28. OJ 2004, L338/18. This Directive 2004/101/EC is also called “the linking Directive”.
29. About these mechanisms, see F. DEHOUSSE and T. ZGAJEWSKI, Climate change: what are the
implications for the international system and the European Union?, Studia Diplomatica, 2008/1, pp. 49-
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and ERUs, however, is limited for each installation to a percentage of its alloca-
tion of allowances.30 For that purpose, each Member State must specify in its
national allocation plan the maximum extent to which companies may use JI or
CDM credits. On the other hand, to ensure the environmental integrity of the
EU ETS, CERs and ERUs should not be issued as a result of project activities
undertaken within the Community that also lead to a reduction in, or limitation
of, emissions from installations covered by the EU ETS, unless an equal number
of allowances is cancelled from the registry of the Member State of the CERs’
or ERUs’ origin. Detailed rules on the treatment of double counting are estab-
lished by Decision 2006/780/EC.31
It is worth noticing that the EU legislation excludes two types of JI/CDM credits:
nuclear credits and land use, land-use change, forestry credits. In addition, con-
ditions are attached to the use of carbon credits from hydroelectric projects
exceeding 20 MW of installed capacity.
3.1.5. Connecting the EU ETS with other GHG trading schemes
Like the EU, other countries are developing, or are considering to develop, their
own national ETS. Directive 2003/87/EC32 already provides for the possibility
of agreement with third countries that are also Kyoto Protocol Annex B signa-
tories on the mutual recognition of allowances between the Community scheme
and other greenhouse gas emission allowance trading schemes.
In this context, it should be reminded that at the end of 2007, the International
Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) was set up. ICAP is a partnership between
the European Commission, a number of Member States, US States, Canadian
provinces, New Zealand and Norway. They share the vision that a global mar-
ket is needed. ICAP provides an international forum in which governments and
public authorities adopting mandatory greenhouse gas emissions cap and trade
systems can share experiences and best practices on the design of emissions trad-
ing schemes. This cooperation will ensure that the programs are more compati-
ble and are able to work together as the foundations of a global carbon market.
30. This limit needs to be seen in the light of the supplementary criterion in the Kyoto Protocol. Accord-
ing to this criterion, the use of flexible mechanisms by industrialised countries must be supplemental to
their domestic reduction efforts.
31. Commission Decision 2006/780/EC of 13 November 2006 on avoiding double counting of green-
house gas emission reductions under the Community emissions trading scheme for project activities under
the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ
2006, L 316/12).
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3.1.6. Registry, monitoring, reporting, verification requirements
A/ Registries
The EU and the Member States are required to establish and maintain registries.
Registries are standardized electronic databases ensuring accurate accounting of
the issuance, holding, transfer and cancellation of emission allowances. The EU
registry is called the “Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL)”. It is
distinct from the national registry that each Member State must maintain.33
So, any transaction of allowances takes place through the system of Member
State registries, themselves linked to the CITL serving as a kind of overall “clear-
inghouse” for all transactions, meaning that it checks each transaction for any
irregularities. Two Regulations 2216/2004/EC34 and 994/2008/EC35 lay down
general provisions, functional and technical specifications and operational and
maintenance requirements concerning a standardized and secured system of reg-
istries in the form of standardized electronic databases containing common data
elements and the CITL. This legislation on registries also includes provisions
concerning the use and identification of CERs and ERUs in the EU ETS. Further-
more, it also foresees, for the period 2008-2012, which coincides with the
period under the Kyoto Protocol, that the CITL and Member State registries are
linked with the International Transaction Log operated by the UNFCCC secre-
tariat. This linkage also enables account holders in EU registries to import from
non-EU registries and use credits from Kyoto Protocol project mechanisms (such
as CERs and ERUs).
It should be noted that the Commission has tabled a draft Regulation36 at the
beginning of 2010 containing amendments to the existing registries regulations
to put notably a definitive end to CER and ERU recycling. If adopted, this new
Regulation will entail the repeal of Regulations 2216/2004 and 994/2008 with
effect normally from 1st January 2012. 
33. See art. 6 of Decision No 280/2004/EC of 11 February 2004 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of concerning a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse gas emissions and for imple-
menting the Kyoto Protocol (OJ 2004, L 49/1), as well as art. 19 and 20 of Directive 2003/87/EC.
34. Commission Regulation (EC) 2216/2004/EC for a standardized and secured system of registries pur-
suant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision 280/2004/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2004, L 386/1). This regulation has been amended by
Regulations 916/2007/EC (OJ 2007, L 200/5) and 994/2008/EC (OJ 2008, L 271/3).
35. Commission Regulation/EC 994/2008/CE for a standardized and secured system of registries pursu-
ant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision 280/2004/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2008, L 271/3).
36.  Draft Commission Regulation (EU) No …/… of … for a standardised and secured system of registries
pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC and Decision 280/2004/EC [C(2010) xxx final – D009444/03].THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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B / Monitoring and reporting
Directive 2003/87/EC requires the Commission to adopt guidelines for the mon-
itoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions under the ETS. The Commis-
sion adopted revised guidelines as Decision 2007/589/EC (so-called the
“MRG”) to be used for the phase 2008-2012 (“MRG 2007”).37 It provides
detailed technical interpretation of the requirements indicated in art. 14 and
Annex IV of Directive 2003/87/EC. Operators of installations in Member States
and candidate countries are required to adhere to these guidelines, which facili-
tate the full, transparent and accurate monitoring and reporting of the CO2
emissions. In simple terms, they ensure that “one tone is one tone” across the
scheme. Decision 2007/589/EC has been amended by decisions 2009/73/EC38
and 2009/339/EC39 to include respectively nitrous oxid and aviation activities.
The verification of emission reports prepared by operators of installations is also
a crucial step in the emission trading compliance cycle. The objective of the
verification is to ensure that emissions have been monitored in accordance with
the guidelines and that reliable and correct emissions data will be reported
according to Art. 14, § 3 of Directive 2003/87/EC. Verification provisions are
legally provided by Art. 15, with criteria set out under Annex IV, of Directive
2003/87/EC and given detailed interpretation in Decision 2007/589/EC.
3.1.7. The functioning of the ETS so far
Given the lack of experience with emissions trading in Europe and the overall
complexity of the system, the establishment of the EU ETS constituted a great
challenge to governments and sectors, particularly when one considers the tight
timetable to implement the system40. From this point of view, its rapid deploy-
ment can be seen as a success. On the other side, the EU ETS has not lead to any
significant CO2 emission reductions so far. On the contrary, emissions have
slightly increased in the first trading period. Furthermore, during the two trad-
ing periods, the EU ETS market was characterized by a swift fall, though for
different reasons.
According to the European Environment Agency, installations received in the
first trading phase allowances for 2 080 Mt CO2 per year but only emitted an
37. Commission Decision 2007/589/EC establishing guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of green-
house gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ 2007, L 229/1).
38. OJ 2009, L 24/18.
39. OJ 2009, L 103/10.
40. Shaping the Global Arena, Preparing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, CEPS Task Force Report,
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average of 2 020 Mt CO2 per year.41 In other words, the allocation exceeded
emissions by 60 Mt per year, corresponding to 3% of the total amount allo-
cated. This over-allocation was visible in almost all Member States. As an imme-
diate result of the over-allocation, allowance prices fell quite dramatically. The
first trading period eventually closed at an allowance price of 0,02 euro.
Things seem better in the second trading period. Verified emissions of green-
house gases from all installations in 2009 totalled 1.873 billion tonnes of CO-
equivalent. Emissions of GHG from EU businesses participating to the EU ETS
fell 11.6% in 2009 compared with 2008 (3,6% compared to 2007).42 This sig-
nificant drop is attributed to several factors. Firstly, the reduced economic activ-
ity as a result of the recession and secondly, the low level of gas prices through-
out 2009 which has made it much more attractive to produce power from gas
rather than more emitting coal. Thirdly, a CO2 price signal much better than in
the first trading period but still too weak (about €13 right now).
Despite the fall of the allowance price at the end of the first period, the EU ETS
has created a functioning allowance market. Banks and other commodities trad-
ers are increasingly active in the market. A number of exchanges offer carbon
trading (for instance, the European Climate Exchange). A transparent price on
tradable CO2 emission allowances emerged as of 1st January 2005. Registries,
monitoring, reporting and verification are in place. In figures, the allowance
market has grown spectacularly, both in terms of volume and value of transac-
tions. In its first year (2005) more than 322 million tonnes of CO2 allowances
were traded on the market, worth more than 6,5 billion euro.43 In 2006 the
scheme saw 1 billion EUAs transacted, worth 18,1 billion euro.44 In 2007, these
figures almost doubled: more than 2 billion allowances were traded correspond-
ing to a market value of 37 billion euro.45 This positive picture has been tar-
nished however later by a series of scandals (including a 5 billion euro VAT
carousel fraud46 that accounted for up to 90% of trading in some EU countries,
41. See Report No. 5/2007 of the European Environment Agency, Greenhouse gas emission trends and
projections in Europe 2007.
42. See Commission’s press release IP/10/576 dated 18 May 2010 on the following web site: http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/576&format=HTML&aged=0&lan-
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en. See also Commission’s press release IP/09/794 dated 15 May 2009 on the
following web site: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/794&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
43. State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2007, The World Bank, May 2007, p. 11, available from
http://carbonfinance.org/docs/Carbon_Trends_2007-_FINAL_-_May_2.pdf
44. Carbon 2007 — A new climate for carbon trading, PointCarbon, 13 March 2007. http://www.point-
carbon.com/getfile.php/fileelement_105366/Carbon_2007_final.pdf.
45. State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008, The World Bank, May 2008, p. 7, available from http:/
/siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/State&Trendsformatted06May10pm.pdf
46. Carousel fraud involves bogus traders buying carbon credits in one country without paying the
appropriate VAT, the same trader then sells them on to another country with the VAT added, but failing
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and the recycling of CDM credits in Hungary, allowing their reductions to be
counted twice47).
All in all, it is obvious that the ETS has had a significant impact on corporate
behaviour. The EU industry sees now that there can be a price to pay for carbon
emissions and takes this new reality into account in its business decisions (but
also tries to keep as many free allocations as possible). As far as the impact of
the scheme on the competitiveness of European companies is concerned, it seems
unlikely that the first years of the ETS have had a significant impact on their
competitive position.
It is also clear that the scheme does not function properly yet. Firstly, the scheme
can only work effectively if EU governments realistically restrict the total
amount of carbon dioxide emissions they make available to companies. The first
trading period was characterized by long allowances (i.e. there is a greater allo-
cation of allowances than industry needs in a “business as usual” scenario). In
other words, the NAPs for 2005-2007 were too generous and this situation led
the price of CO2 to fall dramatically. This of course did not provide a real incen-
tive for companies to invest in clean technologies. So to avoid a similar situation
during the second trading period, the Commission requested an adjustment of
several NAPs for the second trading period when it assessed that the level of the
proposed national cap was excessive48.
Secondly, the widely different national methods for allocating allowances to
installations seem to raise the risk of distortions of competition in the internal
market. In addition, the EU giving emission allowances for free is subject to
critics. Free allocation has also caused windfall profits for the power sector.
Thirdly, the limited scope of application of the scheme, both in terms of sectors
covered and gases included, hinders the ETS impact. Fourthly, harmonization,
47. Marton Kruppa and Ben Garside, 'Hungary sells “recycled” CERs', Point Carbon, 11 March 2010;
Leigh Phillips, 'EU emissions trading an “open door” for crime, Europol says', EU Observer, 10 Decem-
ber 2009; http://euobserver.com/885/29132. In brief, the Hungarian authorities sold two million recycled
Certified Emission Reduction (CERs) in good faith into the market. The CERs had already been used by
Hungarian companies to meet their compliance targets under the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) and were therefore unusable under the scheme.
48. Some Member States concerned contested the Commission’s decision towards them before the Court
of Justice of the European Union, arguing notably that the Commission was not competent to impose
reductions of allowances. See the General Court judgments in Case T-183/07 Poland v Commission and
Case T-263/07 Estonia v Commission. The Commission has appealed on the basis of several grounds
against these judgments which annulled the Commission’s contested decisions. It considers that the Gen-
eral Court has interpreted too narrowly the powers of the Commission in the NAP assessment process,
and has not sufficiently taken into account the objective of the EU ETS to reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases, and the need to ensure the equal treatment of Member States. Interestingly, meanwhile, a new NAP
has been presented by Poland, corrected after observations from the Commission, and finally approved by
the Commission. The total number of allowances finally remains 208.5 Mt per year, which was the level
defined in the first annuled decision. See http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-environment/eu-poland-
move-settle-carbon-quota-row-news-461636.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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clarification and refinement are needed with respect to access to credits from
emission reduction projects outside the EU.
Directive 2009/29/EC has taken these issues into consideration in defining a new
ETS system for the third trading period, beginning on 1 January 2013 and end-
ing on 31 December 2020. It should be noted that this third trading period will
last eight years, as opposed to five years for the second trading period.
Meanwhile, it remains impossible to present a valid evaluation of the ETS effi-
ciency. On the one hand, there is a functioning market and some emissions
reductions have been made49. On the other hand, there have been repeated price
crashes and the biggest of the emissions reduction has been provoked not by the
system itself, but by the increase of the energy prices and the huge industrial
production drop due to the financial crisis. The ETS has also provoked distor-
sions of competition and undue distributional effects50. Basically, the jury is still
out.
3.2. The EU ETS post-2012
3.2.1. The extension of the ETS scope of application
As from 2013, the scope of the EU ETS will be extended in two different direc-
tions. The system will cover additional sectors and additional greenhouse
gases.51
At the sectors level, the scheme will be broadened, for instance to the production
of numerous metals (including aluminium), meaning that it will not be limited
to ferrous metals anymore. It will also be extended to the basic chemical indus-
try (nitric acid or ammonia) or to the production of mineral wool or rock wool.
On the other hand, for the power sector, there is no change. The activity of
capture, transport and geological storage of CO2 will also be covered.
49. See the 2009 Commission’s report: COM (2009) 630.
50. Point Carbon, EU ETS phase II – the potential and scale of windfall profits in the power sector, 2008.
51. See Annex I of Directive 2003/87/EC which has been revised by Directive 2009/29/EC. Guidance on
the interpretation of this revised Annex I has been published in March 2010. It excludes aviation activities
which has its own guidance paper. It is intended as a tool to assist Member States and their competent
authorities in implementing the revised scope of the EU ETS Directive and to achieve consistency in its
interpretation. The guidance can be found on the following Commission’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/
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At the greenhouse gases level, the scheme will be widened to include perfluoro-
carbons (PFCs) in the case of aluminium and nitrous oxide (NO2) coming from
the chemical industry.
According to the Commission, the addition of these sectors and gases will
increase the coverage of the scheme by up to 140 to 150 Mt CO2. International
maritime emissions might be included later52, but emissions from agriculture
and forestry will not. As of 2012, aviation will also be included in the EU ETS,
as it is indicated in Directive 2008/101/EC53. The general exclusion of transport
remains however an important element.
On the other side, it has also been considered that a large number of installations
emitting relatively low amounts of CO2 are currently covered by the ETS and
that the cost-effectiveness of their inclusion is not evident. For that reason, and
to lessen the administrative burden, as from 2013, Member States will be
allowed to remove these installations from the EU ETS provided certain condi-
tions are provided54. The installations concerned are those whose reported emis-
sions were lower than 25 000 tons of CO2 equivalent in each of the 3 years
before the year of application. For combustion installations, an additional
capacity threshold of 35MW applies. In addition, Member States are given the
possibility to exclude installations operated by hospitals. However, these instal-
lations may be excluded from the ETS only if they will be covered by measures
(for instance, taxation, agreement with the industry or regulations) that will
achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions.
3.2.2. The creation of an EU wide cap
The decentralized approach allowing Member States to determine the total
quantity of allowances they intend to allocate and the method to allocate these
allowances to their installations on their territory has been identified as one of
52. In the event that no international agreement which includes international maritime emissions in its
reduction targets through the International Maritime Organisation has been approved by the Member
States or no such agreement through the UNFCCC has been approved by the Community by 31 Decem-
ber 2011, the Commission should make a proposal to include international maritime emissions with the
aim of the proposed act entering into force by 2013.
53. Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amend-
ing Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading within the Community (OJ 2009, L 8/3). Concerning this Directive, three implement-
ing measures have already been adopted. A Commission Decision 2009/450/EC on the detailed interpre-
tation of the aviation activities listed in the Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ 2009, L 149/69-72). A
Commission Regulation (EC) No 82/2010 on the list of aircraft operators specifying the administering
Member State (OJ 2010, L 25/12). A Commission Decision 2009/339/EC on the inclusion of monitoring
and reporting guidelines for emissions and tonne-kilometre data from aviation activities (OJ 2009, L 103/
10).
54. See new art. 27 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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the problems encountered by the EU ETS. It makes the EU ETS complex, creates
an incentive for each Member State to favour its own industry and provokes
discussions between Member States and the Commission. For that reason, this
approach has been replaced by a more centralized approach offering a greater
harmonization of cap-setting and allocation method between Member States.
Two main features characterize this new approach. On the one hand, all aspects
of cap-setting are agreed at EU level. This means that there are no more national
allocation plans since the 27 national caps are suppressed. On the other hand,
as a scarcity of allowances is essential for having a positive CO2 market price, a
reduction of the quantity of allowances to be allocated to EU Member States
will progressively take place.
More concretely, Directive 2009/29/EC foresees that the European Commission
will fix an EU wide cap on emission allowances for each individual year cover-
ing the third trading period. The progressive reduction of these annual EU wide
caps must bring in 2020 to a 21% greenhouse gas emission reduction below
reported 2005 levels (leading thus to a maximum of 1 720 million allowances
issued in 2020). It is consistent with the 20% GHG emission reduction target
below 1990 levels in 2020. A maximum of 5% of the EU-wide quantity of
allowances over the period of 2013 to 2020 will be reserved to new entrants.55
Starting in 2013, the EU annual cap will afterwards decline year by year at an
annual rate of 1.74%56 (compared to the average annual total quantity of allow-
ances issued by Member States for the second trading period). Indeed, the level
at which the cap is set is the primary determinant of the market price for allow-
ances. The scarcer the allowances are, the higher their price.
The estimated annual cap figures indicated by the European Commission57 are
given in the following table:
55. See art. 10a, § 7 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
56. This linear reduction factor will apply after 2020 but will be reviewed as from 2020.
57. See question 12 of Commission’s MEMO/8/35 dated 23 January 2008.
Year Moi t CO2
2013: 1,974
2014: 1,937
2015: 1,901
2016: 1,865
2017: 1,829
2018: 1,792
2019: 1,756
2020: 1,720THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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These cap figures are based on the scope of the EU ETS as applicable in the
second trading period (2008 to 2012) and the Commission’s decisions on NAPs
for this period.58 They will be adjusted however to reflect the broadened scope
of the system in the second trading period (aviation in 2012 for instance) as well
as the broadened scope of the system from 2013, provided that Member States
substantiate and verify their emissions accruing from these extensions. In the
latter case, Directive 2009/29/EC indicates that the Commission will publish
adjusted quantities by 30 September 2010.59 In the meantime, in July 2010, the
cap for 2013 has been fixed by the Commission at 1.926.876.36860. It remains
subject to possible marginal adjustments.
3.2.3. The auctioning becomes the basic rule for allocation of 
allowances
During the first years of the ETS, allowances have been predominantly allocated
for free in the first and second trading periods. For the third trading period, a
fundamental change is operated. Auctioning of allowances becomes the princi-
pal allocation method61. Several reasons explain this choice. Auctioning best
ensures the efficiency, transparency and simplicity of the system and creates the
greatest incentive for investments in a low-carbon economy. Auctioning best
complies with the “polluter pays principle” and avoids giving windfall profits
to certain sectors that have passed on the notional cost of allowances to their
customers despite receiving them for free. Today about 4% of the total number
of allowances are being auctioned. In 2013, around 50% of the total number of
allowances will be auctioned and this proportion will increase in later years.
Auctioning will be used towards all EU allowances which are not allocated free
of charge. The Commission will determine and publish the estimated amount of
allowances to be auctioned by 31 December 2010.62
The distribution amongst Member States of the total quantity of allowances to
be auctioned follows a complex rule. 88% of the allowances for auctioning will
be distributed to all Member States on the basis of their EU ETS emissions from
2005 to 200763. 10% of the allowances for auctioning will be distributed to the
benefit of certain Member States for the purpose of Community solidarity and
growth to be used to reduce emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change.
58. Emissions from Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland are not included.
59. See new art. 9a, § 2 and 3 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
60. Decision C (2010) 4658.
61. Art. 10, § 1 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
62. Art. 10, § 1 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
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A further 2% of the allowances for auctioning will be distributed to the most
virtuous Member States (all of them are Eastern countries) which in 2005 had
achieved a reduction of at least 20% in GHG emissions compared with the base
year applicable to them under the Kyoto Protocol64.
Member States will be responsible for ensuring that the allowances attributed to
them are auctioned. The Commission must adopt a Regulation detailing the
rules for the timing, the administration and other aspects of auctioning in order
to ensure that it is conducted in an open, transparent, harmonised and non-
discriminatory manner65. A proposal for such a Regulation has been tabled by
the Commission66. The latest version of the draft Regulation, supported by the
Commission and approved by the Climate Change Committee in July 2010,
allows Member States to opt out of the common auction platform and set up
their own auction platforms. These must however respect the framework estab-
lished by the draft Regulation and potential further rules to ensure a proper
coordination between the common auction platform and the national ones. The
Commission will have to approve each Member State’ plan about a national
auction platform before it enters into force. The draft Regulation has been sent
to the Parliament and the Council for a three-month scrutiny period.
Finally, Member States can determine the use of auctions’ revenues, but at least
50% of them must be used to fight and adapt to climate change mainly within
the EU, or in developing countries according to some conditions.67 The Member
States will inform the European Commission on the use of revenues through the
reports under the GHG monitoring Decision 280/2004/EC.
3.2.4. The slow death of free allocations post-2012
Free allocation as a method of allocation of EU emission allowances is kept in
the EU ETS post-2012 as a transitional measure.
By 31 December 2010, the Commission will adopt implementing measures68
64. Art. 10, § 2 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
65. Art. 10, § 4 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
66. Commission’s proposal for an auctioning regulation No xxx dated 6 April 2010 on the timing,
administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Direc-
tive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas
emission allowances trading within the Community. This proposal of auctioning Regulation is accompa-
nied by an Impact assessment dated 08 February 2010. Both can be found on the following Commission’s
web site: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/proposed_auctioning_reg.pdf.
67. Art. 10, § 3 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
68. Art. 10a, §  1 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC. These implementing
measures will be reviewed if an international agreement on climate change leading to mandatory reduc-
tions of GHG emissions comparable to those of the Community is agreed (art. 10a, § 1, in fine).THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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detailing the rules for the allocation of EU free allowances. These rules will spec-
ify that free allocations are based on ex-ante benchmarks for the sectors receiv-
ing free allocation in order to ensure that allocations take place in a manner that
provides incentives for GHG reductions and energy efficient techniques. The ex-
ante benchmarks will reflect the average performance of the 10% most efficient
installations (in terms of greenhouse gas emissions) in a sector or sub-sector in
the Community in the years 2007-2008.69 80% of the total quantity of bench-
marked allowances will be allocated for free in 2013, decreasing afterwards
each year by equal amounts resulting in 30% free allocation in 2020, with a
view to reaching no free allocation in 2027.70
Installations of a few sectors only will receive transitional free allocation allow-
ances: district heating; high-efficiency cogeneration in respect of heating and
cooling.71 Here, the total transitional free allocation will gradually decrease in
each year subsequent to 2013 at a linear rate of 1.74%.
More generally, installations in sectors or sub-sectors judged to be at significant
risk of “carbon leakage” (meaning that they could be forced by international
competitive pressures to relocate production to countries outside the EU with
less stringent constraints on GHG emissions, with the consequence that such
attitude would simply increase global emissions without any environmental
benefit) will receive in 2013 and in each subsequent year up to 2020 100% free
allocations.72 A list of the sectors and sub-sectors concerned drawn up on the
basis of detailed criteria on CO2 cost and trade exposure set out in Directive
2009/29/EC73 has already been established by the European Commission in its
decision 2010/2/EU.74 This list applies for five years from adoption, but new
sectors or sub-sectors can be added to the list during this period75. Member
States may also adopt financial measures for installations in energy-intensive
sectors judged to be at significant risk of “carbon leakage.76 Guidelines on state
aid for environmental protection have been modified in this respect.
No transitional free allocation allowances will be given either to installations
for the capture of CO2, to pipelines for transport of CO2 and to CO2 storage
69. Art. 10a, § 2 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
70. Art. 10a, § 11 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
71. Art. 10a, § 4 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
72. Art. 10a, § 12 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
73. Art. 10a, §§ 14 to 17 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
74. Commission’s decision 2010/2/EU of 24 December 2009 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to
be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage (OJ 2010, L 1/10). These decision was subject to an
impact assessment which can be found on the following Commission’s web site: http://ec.europa.eu/envi-
ronment/climat/emission/pdf/proportionate_ia_%20leakage_list16sep.pdf
75. Art. 10a, § 13 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
76. Art. 10a, § 6 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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sites or to electricity generators (new entrants included)77, except those which
will be granted by Member States a derogation to aid modernization of the
electricity sector, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. 78 The transitional
free allocations granted as such to electricity generators must be deducted from
the quantity of allowances that the Member State concerned would otherwise
auction and must not exceed in 2013 70% of the annual average verified emis-
sions in 2005-2007 from such electricity generators.79 They will decrease after-
wards every year with the aim of no free allocation in 2020. Any Member State
that intends to allocate transitional free allowances to electricity producers
have to submit to the Commission an application by 30 September 2011which
contains, on the one hand, the proposed allocation methodology and individual
allocations and, on the other hand, a national plan that provides for invest-
ments in retrofitting and upgrading of the infrastructure and clean technolo-
gies.80
Finally, no transitional free allocation will be given to an installation that has
ceased operations, unless demonstration has been brought that this installation
will resume production within a specified and reasonable time.81
3.2.5. The creation of a New Entrants’ Reserve
A maximum of 5% of the EU-wide quantity of allowances over the period of
2013 to 2020 will be reserved to new entrants.82 By 31 December 2010, the
Commission will adopt harmonized rules for the application of the definition of
“new entrant”.83
Up to 300 million allowances for auctioning in the New Entrants’ Reserve will
be available until 31 December 2015 to support the construction and operation
of up to 12 CCS commercial demonstration projects84 as well as demonstration
projects using innovative renewable energy technologies. There should be a fair
geographical distribution of the projects85.
77. Art. 10a, § 3 and § 7 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
78. Art. 10c, § 1 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
79. Art. 10c, § 2 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
80. Art. 10c, § 5 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
81. Art. 10a, § 19 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
82. See art. 10a, § 7 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
83. Art. 10a, § 7 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
84. Art. 10a, § 8 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
85. Lithuania, as well as any Member State with an electricity network which is interconnected with
Lithuania, may also claim allowances for auctioning from the New Entrants’Reserve under certain condi-
tions (Art. 10a, §§ 9 and 10 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC).THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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In principle, any allowances remaining in the reserve shall be distributed to
Member States for auctioning. The distribution key shall take into account the
level to which installations in Member States have benefitted from this reserve.
3.2.6. A ceiling on the use of CERs and ERUs
Large amount of money are already poured into carbon mitigation schemes
around the world, with many of these being funded as a result of the EU ETS.
There is little doubt that the clearest market signal being given by the EU ETS to
date is that it is cheaper to undertake abatement outside the EU than in it. Con-
cretely, according to the Commission’s latest progress report issued in 2009, “in
total, up to 278 million CERs or ERUs may be used per year by ETS installations
from all Member States in the second trading period. This corresponds to 13.4%
of the EU wide cap for the second trading period. In 2008, operators used 81.7
million CERs or ERUs which was 3.9% of all surrendered allowances”86.
If fostering a global market for carbon abatement is a desirable aim, the EU also
wants to show that genuine action can be achieved at home. Hence, installations
covered by the EU ETS may continue to use carbon credits in the framework of
CDM and JI during the third trading phase. This use must not exceed, however,
50% of the Community-wide reductions below the 2005 levels of the existing
sectors under the Community scheme over the period from 2008 to 2020 and
50% of the Community-wide reductions below the 2005 levels of new sectors
and aviation over the period from the date of their inclusion in the Community
scheme to 202087.
This said, Directive 2009/29/EC does not allow credits from nuclear projects
and from certain types of land use, land-use change and forestry (‘LULUCF’)
projects which absorb carbon from the atmosphere. Before submitting its pro-
posal, the Commission had analyzed such a possibility. It concluded this would
undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS for different reasons88.
3.2.7. Connecting the EU ETS with other GHG trading schemes
With Directive 2009/29/EC, the EU ETS has henceforth clear provisions to link
the EU ETS with other similar schemes created at regional or national levels
outside the EU.89 Indeed, it is necessary to develop more and more the carbon
86. COM (2009) 630, p. 15.
87. Art. 11a, § 8 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
88. See SEC (2008) 52, pp. 56-61.
89. Art. 25, § 1a and b of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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market to make it a global market. In that perspective, the EU would like to
work in particular with the US Administration to create a transatlantic carbon
market which act as a driving force to fight climate change90.
3.2.8. Registry, monitoring and reporting requirements
A / Registries
Directive 2009/29/EC requires that allowances issued from 1 January 2012
onwards will be held in the Community registry instead of in national regis-
tries.91 The scope of the EU ETS has been extended. For all these reasons, a draft
Commission regulation for a standardized and secured system of registries is
under preparation.92 Once adopted, it will repeal Regulations 2216/2004/EC
and 994/2008/EC with effect from 1 January 2012 (see also point 3.1.6.).
B / Monitoring and reporting
In addition, the same Directive 2009/29/EC prescribes that by 31 December
2011, the Commission shall adopt a new Regulation governing the monitoring
and reporting of emissions from activities listed in Annex I of the Directive.
Meanwhile, the Commission’s Decision 2010/345/EU has amended Decision
2007/589/EC establishing guidelines for monitoring and reporting GHG emis-
sions to include CCS of carbon dioxide93.
3.2.9. The link with an international climate agreement 
post-2012
The future of the whole climate package is linked to the conclusion of an inter-
national agreement which should replace the Kyoto protocol after 2012, and
this is also valid for the ETS system. The consequences of such an agreement
have been foreseen by Directive 2009/29/EC. The consequences of the absence
of such an agreement have also been foreseen. If this international agreement is
concluded, the Commission shall submit quickly a report to the European Par-
90. This of course will not be made easier by the abandonment of the legislative projects aiming to estab-
lish a US cap and trade system.
91. Art. 19, § 1 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
92. Draft Commission Regulation (EU) No …/… of […] for a standardized and secured system of regis-
tries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision 280/
2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council – C(2010) XXX final D008416/03. This draft
can be found on the following web site: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/
regreg_iv_final_consolid_100416.pdf. (accessed August 10, 2010).
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liament and the Council assessing the nature of the measures agreed upon in the
international agreement and their implications for the EU.94 On the basis of this
report, the Commission shall then present a legislative proposal amending
Directive 2009/29/EC as appropriate.
If the negotiations to establish a new international climate agreement fail, or if
major emitters refuse to participate to it – that was the case in Copenhagen in
December 2009 – this will place EU energy-intensive sectors in a position of
competitive disadvantage. The risk of carbon leakage will increase. Therefore,
Directive 2009/29/EC obliged the European Commission to submit a report by
30 June 2010 and to carry an in-depth assessment of the situation with regard
to energy-intensive sectors or sub-sectors that have been determined to be
exposed to significant risks of carbon leakage by 31 March 2011, accompanied
in both cases by proposals considered appropriate95.
Following the failure of the Copenhagen conference, the Commission has thus
presented its assessment of the carbon leakage threat after the Copenhagen
Accord. According to its analysis, the Accord’s impact is not significant enough
to motivate a change in the measures now used to address the risk of carbon
leakage: free allocation, use of international credits and possibility of financial
compensation for costs related to greenhouse gas emissions passed on in elec-
tricity. If the EU stepped up to 30% while all other countries would keep their
low pledges, this would not lead to significant impacts on EU energy intensive
industry’s output compared to other countries, if crediting mechanisms are kept
in place. The relative loss for EU energy intensive industry would remain largely
unchanged if not slightly improved compared to the case where the EU imple-
mented the lower end pledge of 20% unilaterally96.
Furthermore, as said, Directive 2009/29/EC extends the operators’ rights to use
credits generated by emission-saving projects undertaken in third countries for
the third trading period (see point 3.2.7. above). But the Kyoto framework does
not enable ERUs to be created from 2013 onwards without new quantified
emission targets being in place for host countries. CDM credits can potentially
continue to be generated. In the hypothesis that an international agreement
post-2012 is not concluded or is delayed (which was the case in Copenhagen in
2009), there will be for sure a problem regarding the unused allowances
acquired by operators of installations under the JI and CDM mechanisms during
the trading period of 2008-2012.
94. Art. 28, § 1 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
95. Art. 10b, §§ 1 and 2 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
96. CEC, Unlocking Europe's potential in clean innovation and growth – Analysis of options to move
beyond 20% – Commission staff working document. [COM (2010) 265, chap. 7]THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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Directive 2009/29/EC has anticipated such a problem and provides solutions in
view of giving some predictability to operators of installations covered by the
EU ETS. On the one hand, it establishes a specific regime which offers, without
entering into details, the possibility to operators to exchange their unused CERs
and ERUs allowed in the period from 2008 to 2012 with allowances valid from
2013 onwards.97 On the other hand, it prescribes to use credits from high-qual-
ity projects in the Community scheme in accordance with agreements with third
countries. Such agreements may be bilateral or multilateral. Once an interna-
tional agreement has been concluded, only credits from projects from third
countries which have ratified that agreement shall be accepted in the Commu-
nity scheme from 1 January 2013.
97. Art.11 of Directive 2003/87/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.37
4. The Obligations of the non ETS Sectors
In the present legal framework, the obligations of the Member States regarding
the non ETS sectors are quite limited. However, they have to reach the global
targets imposed by the Kyoto commitments. The non ETS sectors are thus cov-
ered by the general surveillance regime of Decision 280/2004/EC. New obliga-
tions will be added by Decision 406/2009/EC.
4.1. The general surveillance regime of Decision 280/2004/EC
Decision 99/296/EC did not cover the requirements on monitoring and report-
ing under the Kyoto Protocol as agreed at COP 6 in Bonn and COP 7 in Mar-
rakech. Therefore, in 2004, Decision 280/2004/EC concerning a mechanism for
monitoring Community greenhouse emissions and for implementing the Kyoto
Protocol was adopted (hereafter “the second monitoring decision”)98.
Under this second monitoring decision, Member States and the Community are
respectively required to devise, publish and implement national programs and a
Community program for limiting or reducing their anthropogenic emissions by
sources and enhancing removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled
by the Montreal Protocol in order to contribute: (a) the stabilization of CO2
emissions by 2000 at 1990 levels (this objective was met by the Community and
its Member States) but also the fulfillment of the Community’s and its Member
States’ commitments related to the limitation and/or reduction of all greenhouse
gas emissions under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and (b) transparent
and accurate monitoring of the actual and projected progress of Member States,
including the contribution made by Community measures, in meeting the Com-
munity’s and its Member States’ commitments relating to the limitation and/or
reduction of all greenhouse gas emissions under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol.
These national programs must be updated and include information on:
• national policies and measures which limit and/or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by sources or enhance removals by sinks on a sectoral basis for
each greenhouse gas;
• national projections of greenhouse gas emissions by sources and their
removal by sinks as a minimum for the years 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020,
organized by gas and by sector;
98. Decision 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 February 2004 concerning
a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse emissions and for implementing the Kyoto Protocol
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• measures being taken or planned for the implementation of relevant Com-
munity legislation and policies, and information on legal and institutional
steps to prepare to implement commitments under the Kyoto protocol as
well as information on arrangements for, and national implementation of,
compliance and enforcement procedures;
• institutional and financial arrangements and decision making procedures to
coordinate and support activities related to participation in the mechanisms
the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol.
In addition, Member States are required to communicate supplementary infor-
mation to the Commission (by 15 January each year at the latest) for the assess-
ment of progress and the preparation of annual reports by the Community as
required under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Such information
includes the elements mentioned in Article 3 of the decision.
Furthermore, Member States had to establish by 31 December 2005 national
inventory systems for the estimation of greenhouse gas emissions and removals
on their territory. Each year, the Commission in cooperation with the Member
States compiles a Community greenhouse gas inventory and a Community
greenhouse gas report. It circulates these in draft to the Member States by 28
February and publishes and submits them to the UNFCCC Secretariat by 15
April. For 2006, the Commission had to adopt a Community inventory system.
The Commission fulfils these tasks with the assistance of the European Environ-
mental Agency.
The EU and Member States are also required to establish and maintained regis-
tries in order to ensure the accurate accounting of the issue, holding, transfer,
acquisition, cancellation and withdrawal of assigned amount units, removal
units, emission reduction units and certified emission reductions and the carry-
over of assigned amount units, emission reduction units and certified emission
reductions. These registries incorporate registries established pursuant to Article
19 of Directive 2003/87/EC. The Community and Member States may maintain
their registries in a consolidated system, together with one or more other Mem-
ber States.
Each year, the Commission evaluates whether the progress made throughout the
Community is sufficient to meet the commitments made under the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol. On the basis of the assessment, the Commission submit
a report to the European Parliament and the Council. This report must contain
information on projected emissions and removals, and on policies and measures
taken to reduce emissions. The European Environmental Agency also provides
assistance to fulfill these tasks.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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Since the adoption of decision 280/2004/EC, different progress reports have
been adopted. Compared to the previous progress reports, they take into
account the enlargement and assess the progress of the 25, now 27, Member
States. Although they assessed the progress of the EU-25, developments in the
EU-15 are however often highlighted because of their collective target and the
burden sharing agreement99.
Where appropriate, Decision 280/2004/EC will be amended in order to imple-
ment the obligations organised by Decision 406/2009/EC.
4.2. The new obligations of Decision 406/2009/EC
The non-ETS sectors covered by decision 406/2009/EC include all sectors except
installations covered by the EU ETS; land use, land-use change, forests
(LULUCF); international maritime shipping. Taken together, they currently rep-
resent some 60% of total GHG emissions in the EU. Some of them are thus
essential.
In the non-ETS sectors, Member States hold key competences to adopt and
implement climate policies and measures. Such measures can include traffic
management, shifts away from carbon-based transport, taxation regimes, the
promotion of public transport, urban and transport planning, improved energy
performance standards for buildings more efficient heating systems, renewable
energy for heating, etc. At the same time, a number of EU-wide measures con-
tribute to emission reductions in these sectors. The most important of these EU
measures relate to energy performance of buildings and eco-design requirements
for energy-using products; as well as to emissions performance standards for
new passenger cars and light commercial vehicules; waste; soil protection; fluor-
inated greenhouse gases, labelling systems to inform consumers.
According to Decision 406/2009/EC, the non-ETS sectors in the EU must reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions by 10% by 2020 in comparison with 2005 lev-
els100. The effort to reach this 10% target has been divided among the 27 Mem-
ber States. Each has received its own individual emission reduction target,
expressed as a percentage. Each individual target has been primarily calculated
on the wealth of the country (GDP per capita).This should ensure that the reduc-
99. COM (2004) 818; COM (2005) 655; COM (2006) 658; COM (2007) 757; COM (2008) 651; COM
(2009) 630.
100. OJ 2009, L 140/136-148.
At first sight, the reference to 2005 and not to 1990 may seem curious. However, considering the huge
changes that have happened from 1990 onwards, this simplifies the understanding of the requirements.
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tion efforts and associated costs are distributed in a fair and equitable manner
whilst allowing for further economic growth in less wealthy Member States.
Consequently, Member States’ targets stretch from –20% for the richest Mem-
ber States to +20% for poorer ones compared to 2005 levels.
These Member States’ reduction targets are set out in Annex II of Decision 406/
2009/EC and are shown in the table below. They have to take place between
2013 and 2020. In addition, emission reductions in each Member State have to
decline year by year according to a linear manner. 101 Determination by the
European Commission of the annual emission allocations for the period 2013
to 2020 in terms of tons of carbon dioxide equivalent is expected once reviewed
and verified emission data are available102. If a Member State’s GHG emissions
exceed the annual emission allocation, some corrective measures must be
taken103.
101. Art. 3, § 2 of Decision 406/2009/EC.
102. Art. 3, § 2 of Decision 406/2009/EC.
103. Art. 7 of Decision 406/2009/EC.
Belgium –15%
Bulgaria 20%
Czech Republic 9%
Denmark –20%
Germany –14%
Estonia 11%
Ireland –20%
Greece –4%
Spain –10%
France –14%
Italy –13%
Cyprus –5%
Latvia 17%
Lithuania 15%
Luxembourg –20%
Hungary 10%
Malta 5%
Netherlands –16%
Austria –16%
Poland 14%
Portugal 1%
Romania 19%
Slovenia 4%
Slovakia 13%
Finland –16%
Sweden –17%
United Kingdom –16%THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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4.3. Flexibility mechanisms post-2012
Decision 406/2009/EC allows some degree of flexibility. A Member State is
allowed to carry forward from the following year a quantity of up to 5% of its
annual emission allocation or to carry over excess emission reductions of a given
year to the subsequent years It may also request from the European Commission
a carry forward rate superior to 5% in 2013 and 2014 in the event of extreme
meteorological conditions which have led to substantially increased GHG emis-
sions in those years compared to years with normal meteorological conditions.
It may transfer up to 5% of its annual emission allocation for a given year to
other Member States. It may also transfer the part of its annual emission alloca-
tion that that exceeds its GHG emissions for that year to other Member
States.104 Modalities concerning the last two transfers will be adopted by the
European Commission.
Finally, a limited use each year of carbon credits from CDM, JI and other
projects implemented in third countries is also permitted. In synthesis, this limit
has been defined as 3% of the GHG emissions of the Member States in 2005105.
4.4. The impact of a new international climate agreement 
post-2012
Within three months after the signature of an international agreement by the EU
leading to emission reductions exceeding 20% compared to 1990 levels, the
Commission will submit a report on the numerous implications of this agree-
ment. On the basis of this report, it will submit a legislative proposal to amend
Decision 406/2009/EC106. The legislative proposal shall allow, as appropriate,
Member States to use, in addition to the credits provided for in this Decision,
CERs, ERUs or other approved credits from projects in third countries which
have ratified the international agreement on climate change 107 In addition, from
January 2013, only credits from projects in third countries which have ratified
that international agreement are used.
Furthermore, the Commission shall propose, on the basis of rules agreed as part
of an international agreement, “to include emissions and removals related to
land use, land use change and forestry in the Community reduction commit-
ment, as appropriate, according to harmonized modalities ensuring permanence
104. Art. 3, §§ 3 to 5 of Decision 406/2009.
105. Art. 5 of Decision 406/2009.
106. Art. 8, §§ 1 and 2 of Decision 406/2009.
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and the environmental integrity of the contribution of land use, land use change
and forestry as well as accurate monitoring and accounting”108.
108. Art. 8, § 6 of Decision 406/2009/CE.43
5. Renewable Energies
There are already two important texts which promote the use of renewable
energy sources: Directive 2001/77/EC109 on the promotion of electricity pro-
duced from renewable energy sources and Directive 2003/30/EC on the promo-
tion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport 110. However,
Directive 2009/28/EC has introduced many changes in this field. It will as a
matter of fact abrogate the two previous directives on 1 January 2012.111 A few
provisions of these two directives will be, however, repealed before that.
5.1. The development of a renewable energy policy in 
the EU
5.1.1. The first step
In 1997, the White Paper entitled “energy for the future: renewable sources of
energy”112 set an indicative target of a 12% share of renewable energy in gross
inland consumption.This target represented a doubling of the contribution from
renewable energies compared with 1997. This policy was founded on the need
to address sustainability concerns surrounding climate change and air pollution,
improve security of Europe’s energy supply and develop Europe’s competitive-
ness and industrial and technological innovation. The White Paper also con-
tained a comprehensive strategy and action plan (to be updated regularly) set-
ting out the means to reach the objective. A key element of the action plan was
the establishment of a European legislation to provide a stable policy framework
and clarify the expected development of renewable energy in each Member
State. The two key pieces of legislation resulting from that were Directives 2001/
77/EC and 2003/30/EC. They set indicative 2010 targets for all Member States
and required actions to improve the growth, development and acess of renewa-
ble energy. In addition a Biomass Action Plan113 was adopted in 2005 to focus
attention on the specific need for Member States to develop Europe’s biomass
resources.
109. Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of electricity
produced from renewable energy sources in the internal market (OJ 2001, L 283/33).
110. Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 May 2003 on the promo-
tion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport (OJ 2003, L 123, 42-46).
111. Art. 26 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
112. Communication from the Commission – Energy for the future: renewable sources of energy – White
Paper for a Community strategy and action plan [Com(97) 599].
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Reports have been prepared on the EU’s progress towards its 2010 target and
on its efforts in general to develop renewable energy. The 2007 report as well as
the Renewable Energy Roadmap114 highlighted the slow progress Member
States were making and the likelihood that the EU as a whole would fail to reach
its 2010 targets. The Roadmap explained possible reasons for this, which
included the merely indicative nature of the national targets and the uncertain
investment environment provided by the existing legal framework. The latest
report, issued in 2009, confirmed this pessimistic view. It highlighted, that
renewable energies have increased their contribution by ± 6% versus the objec-
tive of 12% in 2010 but, despite the progress made, it expected that the target
of 12% would not be met. The Commission expected a 9% share in 2010115.
5.1.2. The second step
In 2007, the European Council adopted a comprehensive energy action plan for
the period 2007-2009116. It put particular emphasis on the role that renewable
energy and biofuels might play with regard to the integrated EU climate and
energy policy above and fixed highly ambitious quantified targets on their use.
A binding target of 20% share of renewable energies was accepted for 2020117.
A binding minimum target of 10% was also established for the share of biofuels
in overall EU transport patrol and diesel consumption by 2020. However, this
binding character of the 10% target was subject to three conditions: the sustain-
ability of biofuels production, the commercial availability of second-generation
biofuels, and the modification accordingly of the fuel quality Directive118 to
allow for adequate levels of blending.
According to the Commission, the EU 20% renewable energy target would
bring several advantages for the EU as a whole119. It would help the EU to
reduce GHG and reach a low emission economy since renewable energies are
low-carbon energies and promise cut of the GHG emissions of almost 800 mil-
lion tonnes a year. It would improve energy security since the EU would be less
dependent on imports of oil and gas and, consequently, less exposed to rising
114. COM (2006) 848.
115. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – The Renewa-
ble Energy Progress in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2001/77/EC, Article 4(2) of Directive 2003/
30/EC and on the implementation of the EU Biomass Action Plan [COM (2009) 192.
116. Annex I to the European Council conclusions contains the action plan. This action plan is based on
a Commission communication entitled “An energy policy for Europe” [COM(2007) 1].
117. See Commission’s communication COM(2008) 30, p. 2. See also Annex I of the Presidency conclu-
sions of the Brussels European Council, 8-9 March, 2007 [Council document 7224/1/07 Rev. 1 dated 2
May, 2007, points 28 and 32]. This Annex I contains
118. Directive 98/70/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 relating to
the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Council Directive 93/12/EEC (JOCE 1998, L 350/58).
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and volatile energy prices. It would also contribute to the Lisbon Strategy for
growth and jobs since it has been estimated that one million jobs would be
created in the sector. The latter is, in addition, very labour-intensive for many
small- and medium-size enterprises. Finally, it would help to save some 100 bil-
lion Euros.
All this led to the adoption of Directive 2009/28/EC which establishes a more
rigorous framework to develop renewable energy and more solid obligations
(though no sanctions have been foreseen in case of failure) for 2020. This Direc-
tive must be transposed by 5 December 2010.
According to various sources, the share of renewable energies in the EU’s final
energy consumption amounted more or less to 8.5% in 2008. To reach the fixed
20% target by 2020, the EU will thus have necessarily to make a huge effort of
11.5%. This requires among other things significant infrastructure investments.
According to the European authorities, such investment costs should however
fall as other energy producers face the costs of ETS allowances and rising price
for oil and gas120.
By comparison with the 2010 targets, the European Commission seems much
more optimistic for the 20% target by 2020 imposed henceforth in Directive
2009/28/EC. On the basis of the Forecast Documents, submitted by the Member
States recently, the European Commission has calculated that the net result for
2020 renewable energy consumption should exceed its 20% target by over 0.3
percentage points (see for more details point 5.9).121
5.2. The current legislative framework and its objectives 
for 2010
5.2.1. Renewable energy in the electricity sector
Directive 2001/77/EC122 on the promotion of electricity produced from renew-
able energy sources in the internal market set a 22,1% (which became 21% after
the 2004 enlargement) indicative share of electricity produced from renewable
energy sources in total Community electricity consumption by 2010. It defined
120. See Commission’s communication COM(2008) 30, p. 7.
121. The Summary of the Member States’ forecast documents can be found on the following web site:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/transparency_platform/doc/0_forecast_summary.pdf
122. Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal market (OJEC
2001, L 283/33). This Directive was modified by Directive 2006/108/EC (OJ 2006, L 363/414) and
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national  indicative targets for each Member State, encouraged the use of
national support schemes, the elimination of administrative barriers and the
provision of a better grid access. It also established a guarantee of origin regime.
Partly induced by this legislation, Member States put in place a range of support
measures for promoting renewable electricity, market based instruments that
compensate for the various market failures that leave renewable energy at a
competitive disadvantage compared to conventional energy in particular the
negative externalities of fossil fuels and security of energy supply.
Currently, the 27 Member States operate 27 different support schemes. Accord-
ing to a 2008 Commission staff working document123, despite the requirements
established in Directive 2001/77/EC and the member States’ efforts, some major
barriers to the growth and integration of renewable electricity remain. The har-
monisation of support schemes remains a long-term goal on economic effi-
ciency, single market and state aid grounds, but that harmonisation is not appro-
priate in the short-term. This being said, a 2008 study showed that the part of
electricity produced from renewable energy in the EU-27 consumption was only
13.7% in 2006124. The Commission has estimated however that with current
policies and efforts in place, a share of 19% can be expected by 2010 (rather
than 21%)125. Although this is not fully satisfactory, there has clearly been a
positive evolution. In 2009, a new progress report has confirmed those trends126
5.2.2. The transport sector with regard to biofuels
In 2003, the EU had adopted Directive 2003/30/EC (hereafter the “biofuels
Directive”) with the objective of boosting both the production and consumption
of biofuels in the EU. Since then, the Commission has set out its comprehensive
strategy for developing the biofuels sector127.
The 2003/30 Directive established indicative targets of 2% share for biofuels in
petrol and diesel consumptions in 2005 and 5.75% share in 2010. The 2005
target share of 2% was not achieved. Biofuels counted for 1% of transport fuel
in 2005 and one Member State, Germany, counted for two thirds of total EU
consumption128. The Commission’s conclusion according to the assessment of
123. Commission staff working document – The support of electricity from renewable energy sources
[SEC (2008) 57]. This document accompanies document COM (2008) 19.
124. This report can be viewed on the Commission web site: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/res/publications/
doc/2008_03_progress_final_report_en.pdf
125. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use
of energy from renewable sources [COM (2008) 19], p. 3.
126. The Renewable Energy Progress Report. SEC (2009) 503.
127. A EU strategy for biofuels [COM (2006) 34].
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the progress is that the target for 2010 is not likely to be achieved – expectations
are for a share of about 4.2%129. The results in the field of transport are thus
less satisfactory than in the field of electricity. It is surprising considering the
strong rise of the oil price from 2005.
5.2.3. Renewable energy in the heating and cooling sector
In the current EU legislation, no specific targets have been set to increase the
share of renewable energies used in the heating and cooling sector in the EU. The
latter seem to have attracted little political attention. A report from the Euro-
pean Parliament with recommendations to the Commission on heating and
cooling from renewable sources of energy had been established in 2006130
though. It invited the Commission to submit a legislative proposal for increasing
the share of renewable energies in the sector.
This attitude is quite understandable for nearly half of the EU’s final energy
consumption is used for the generation of heat, making the RES-heating sector
a sleeping giant.131
5.3. Directive 2009/28/EC
5.3.1. The definition of energy from renewable sources
In Directive 2009/28/EC, energy from renewable sources means “energy from
renewable non-fossil sources, namely wind, solar, aerothermal, geothermal,
hydrothermal and ocean energy, hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, sewage
treatment plant gas and biogases”. It does not thus encompass nuclear
energy.132
5.3.2. The targeted sectors
Three sectors are concerned by the requirement to increase the use of renewable
energy sources: electricity, heating and cooling, transport. As far as the heating
and cooling sector is concerned, Directive 2009/28/EC finally closes the legisla-
tive gap which exists so far for this sector.
129. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use
of energy from renewable sources. [COM (2008) 19], p. 3.
130. See document A6-0020/2006 du 1.2.2006.
131. Renewable Technology Roadmap, 20% by 2020, EREC, 2008, p.2.
132. Art. 2, (a) of Directive 2009/28/EC .THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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5.3.3. The EU 20% objective by 2020
At the EU level, Directive 2009/28/EC sets a mandatory global target of 20%
share of energy from renewable sources in overall Community energy consump-
tion by 2020. This includes a mandatory 10% minimum target to be achieved
by all Member States for the share of renewable sources in transport.
5.3.4. The Member States’ individual target
A / The global 20% target
The EU 20% target has been broken down into 27 differentiated legally binding
national targets, as shown in the table below. The Commission based its calcu-
lation for each Member State on its share of renewable energy in 2005, modu-
lated in order to reflect the efforts already done. On such a basis, the Commis-
sion added (a) an equal percentage for all Member States and (b) a different
percentage established according to their GDP.
Each legally binding national target represents a percentage of energy from
renewable sources of the country’s “gross” final consumption of energy. This
gross final consumption of energy from renewable sources has been defined as
“the energy commodities delivered for energy purposes to industry, transport,
househols, services (including public services), agriculture, forestry and fisher-
ies, including the consumption of electricity and heat by the energy branch for
electricity and heat production and including losses of electricity and heat in
distribution and transmission”.133 It is calculated as the sum of: (a) the gross
final consumption of electricity from renewable sources; (b) the gross final con-
sumption of energy from renewable sources for heating and cooling; and (c) the
final consumption of energy from renewable sources in transport (which
includes consumption of, for instance, jet kerosene in aviation134 or heavy fuel
in domestic shipping).135
133. Art. 2 (f) of directive 2009/ 28/ EC.
134. It should be noted that the amount of energy consumed in aviation shall, as a proportion of the
Member State’s gross final consumption of energy, be considered to be no more than 6,18%. For Cyprus
and Malta, the amount of energy consumed in aviation, as a proportion of those Member States’ gross
final consumption of energy, be considered to be no more than 4,12%. See art. 5, point 6, al. 3 of Direc-
tive 2009/28/EC.
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B / The 10% target in transport
Each Member State has to achieve by 2020 a 10% minimum share of energy
produced from renewable sources in transport. These 10% represent the per-
centage of the country’s “final” consumption in transport of only: (a) patrol; (b)
diesel; (c) biofuels consumed in road and rail transport; (d) electricity in trans-
port. 136 Consequently, the consumption of, for instance, jet kerosene in aviation
or heavy fuel in domestic shipping is excluded for the calculation of the 10%.
In other words, the notion of “final consumption of energy from renewable
sources in transport” which is used to calculate the 10% target is more limited
EU Countries
Share of energy from renewable 
sources in gross final consumption 
of energy, 2005 (S2005)
Target for share of energy from 
renewable sources in gross final 
consumption of energy, 2020 
(S2020)
Belgium 2.2% 13%
Bulgaria 9.4% 16%
Czech Republic 6.1% 13%
Denmark 17% 30%
Germany 5.8% 18%
Estonia 18% 25%
Ireland 3.1% 16%
Greece 6.9% 18%
Spain 8.7% 20%
France 10.3% 23%
Italy 5.2% 17%
Cyprus 2.9% 13%
Latvia 32,6% 40%
Lithuania 15.0% 23%
Luxemburg 0.9% 11%
Hungary 4.3% 13%
Malta 0.0% 10%
The Netherland 2.4% 14%
Austria 23.3% 34%
Poland 7.2% 15%
Portugal 20.5% 31%
Romania 17.8% 24%
Slovenia 16.0% 25%
Slovak Republic 6.7% 14%
Finland 28.5% 38%
Sweden 39.8% 49%
United Kingdom 1.3% 15%
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than the one used, as an element among others, to calculate the share of energy
from renewable sources in the country’s gross final consumption (see above).
Moreover, the counting for the calculation of the 10% of the final consumption
of energy from renewable sources in transport on the one hand and the counting
for the calculation of the final consumption of energy from renewable sources
in transport as an element to demonstrate the share of energy from renewable
sources in the country’s gross final consumption are both different. For the
former, second generation biofuels count twice137 and electricity from renewa-
ble used in road vehicules counts 2,5 times138. For the latter, these factors do not
apply. Second generation biofuels and electricity from renewable used in road
vehicules count only once.
5.3.5. The monitoring of the Member States’ progress
To be sure that its targets are reached, each Member State is required to do two
things.139 Firstly, it must adopt a Renewable Energy Action Plan complying
with a template elaborated by the European Commission.140 Such a plan aims
at providing the Member State the flexibility to decide for itself how it wants to
meet its national targets, but at the same time it creates investor security and
helps to mobilize private capital by setting clear goal and mechanisms on the
national level. The action plan contains, notably, a specific sectoral target for
each of the three sectors concerned by renewable energies (electricity, heating
and cooling and transport) by 2020. It also describes the measures to be taken
to reach these sectoral targets (including the cooperation between the different
national, regional, local authorities and national policies to develop existing
biomass resources). It takes into account the effects of other policies measures
related to energy efficiency. The action plan had to be notified to the European
Commission by 30 June 2010. Six months before this due date, the Member
State also must publish and notify to the Commission a forecast document141.
In February 2010, the Commission had received all Member States’ forecast
documents142. In June 2010, most action plans had not been received.
137. Art. 21, § 2 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
138. Art. 3, § 4, (c) in fine of Directive 2009/28/EC.
139. Art. 4 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
140. This template was published on 15.07.2009. See Decision 2009/548/EC (OJ 2009, L 182/33).
141. This forecast document gives two types of information: (a) the Member State’s estimated excess of
production of renewable energy compared to the indicative trajectory which could be transferred to other
Member States, as well as its estimation for potential joint projects until 2020; (b) the Member State’s
estimated demand for renewable energy to be satisfied by means other than domestic production until
2020.
142. Member States’ forecast document can be found on the following web site: http://ec.europa.eu/
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Secondly, each Member State must follow an indicative trajectory. This indica-
tive trajectory foresees interim targets per Member State to be reached every two
years until 2020. The indicative trajectory encompasses four interim targets (for
2011/2012; for 2013/2014; for 2015/2016; 2017/2018) which are a% share of
the Member State’s 2020 target. If the Member State falls under an interim tar-
get, it must communicate to the Commission a modified renewable energy
action plan to rejoin within a reasonable timetable the indicative trajectory. The
Commission evaluates it and may issue a recommendation. The latter can also
release the Member State of the obligation to submit an amended action plan if
its failure is limited.
5.3.6. Other energy from renewable sources to be taken into 
account in national targets
In addition to the energy from renewable sources consumed on its territory, a
Member State can count towards its own national targets:
A / Energy from renewable sources consumed in other Member States
This can be done on a voluntary basis through three different mechanisms of
cooperation: statistical transfers between two Member States, joint projects
between Member States or joint support schemes. Notification of such opera-
tions must be sent to the European Commission.
• Statistical transfer between two Member States.143 A specified amount of
energy from renewable sources may be transferred from one Member State
to another one. In that case, the transferred quantity is deducted from the
amount of energy from renewable sources of the Member State which makes
the transfer and added to the amount of energy from renewable sources of
the other Member State accepting the transfer.
• Joint projects between Member States.144 Two or more Member States may
cooperate on all types of joint projects relating to the production of electri-
city, heating or cooling from renewable energy sources. This cooperation
may involve private operators. Here too, the proportion or amount of elec-
tricity or heating or cooling produced from renewable sources in a Member
State participating to the joint project can count towards towards the natio-
nal overall target of another Member State.
143. Art. 6 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
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• Joint support schemes.145 T wo or more Member States may also join or
partly coordinate their national support schemes. In such cases, a certain
amount of energy from renewable sources produced in the territory of one
participating Member State may count towards the national overall target of
another participating Member State according to different conditions.
B / Imported electricity
Imported electricity is produced from renewable energy sources outside the
Community (meaning in a third country), provided certain conditions are ful-
filled.146 These conditions are the following: on the one hand, the imported elec-
tricity has been produced by renewable energy installations that become opera-
tional after the entry into force of the present renewable directive or by the
increased capacity of an installation that was refurbished after the date of entry
into force of the present renewable directive. On the other hand, to ensure that
such imports can be tracked and accounted for in a reliable way, agreements
with third countries concerning the organization of such trade in electricity from
renewable sources will be considered.
5.3.7. National support schemes
As in the framework of Directive 2001/77/EC, the Member States may adopt
support schemes to provide incentives to develop the production and consump-
tion of renewable energy.147
Generally, they will aim at reducing the costs, increasing the sale prices, or
increasing the purchased volume of such energy. This covers, but is not restricted
to, investment aid, tax exemptions or reductions, tax refunds, renewable energy
obligation support schemes including those using green certificates, and direct
price support schemes including feed-in tariffs and premium payments.
145. Art. 11 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
146. Art. 9 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
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5.3.8. Measures aiming at fostering renewable energies in the 
electricity sector
A / Guarantees of origin (GoOs)
Member States ensure the origin of electricity produced from renewable energy
sources can be guaranteed.148 The aim is to prove to final consumers that a given
quantity of energy in a supplier’s energy mix was produced from renewable
sources.
To this end, a Guarantee of origin (GoO) must be issued in response to a request
from a producer of electricity produced from renewable sources:
• a GoO is of a standard size of 1 MWh. This 1 MWh can be taken into
account only once;
• a GoO may only be used within 12 months of the production of the 1 MWh.
It is cancelled once it has been used;
• GoOs can only be used by an electricity supplier to prove the share or quan-
tity of renewable energy in its energy mix;
• the designated competent bodies supervise the issuance, transfer, cancellation
of GoOs. These operations must be done electronically. The system must be
accurate, reliable and fraud-resistant;
• the designated competent bodies have non-overlapping geographical respon-
sibilities and are independent of generation/trade/supply activities;
MS must recognize GoOs issued in another MS. A refusal of recognition can
only take place in case of serious doubts about the GoO. The refusal decision
must be sent to the Commission with justification. The Commission after exam-
ination can oblige the MS to recognize the GoO.
B / The simplification of administrative procedures
Member States ensure that any national rules concerning the authorisation, cer-
tification and licensing procedures that are applied to plants and associated
transmission and distribution network infrastructures for the production of
electricity from renewable sources are proportionate and necessary, as well as
objective, transparent, non-discriminatory between applicants and take fully
into account the particularities of technologies.149 To that end, they coordinate
and define clearly the respective responsibilities of national, regional and local
administrative bodies, with transparent timetables for determining planning and
148. Art. 15 of Directive 2009/29/EC.
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building applications. They also ensure that comprehensive information be
given and be available at the appropriate administrative level. In addition,
administrative charges have to remain transparent and cost-related. Finally, for
smaller projects and for decentralized renewable devices, where appropriate,
simplified authorization procedures have to be foreseen.
C / The facilitation of access to the grid
Member States also ensure that TSOs and DSOs guarantee the transmission and
distribution of electricity produced from renewable energy sources and provide
for either priority access or guaranteed access to the grid-system of electricity
produced from renewable energy sources.150 Priority access to the grid means
that connected generators of electricity from renewable energy sources will be
able to sell and transmit their electricity in accordance with connection rules at
all times, whenever the source become available. Guaranteed access, in the event
that the electricity from renewable energy sources is integrated into the spot
market, means that all electricity sold and supported gets access to the grid. This
does not imply any obligation on the part of Member States to support or intro-
duce purchase obligations for energy from renewable sources.
Moreover, Member States ensure that TSOs, when dispatching electricity gener-
ating installations, give priority to generating installations using renewable
energy sources insofar as the secure operation of the national electricity system
permits151 and based on transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. In case
significant measures are taken to curtail renewable energy sources in order to
guarantee the security of the national electricity system and security of energy
supply, the responsible system operators have to report to the competent author-
ity on those measures and indicate which corrective measures they intend to take
in order to prevent inappropriate curtailments.
TSOs and DSOs provide any new producer wishing to be connected to the sys-
tem with the comprehensive and necessary information required (notably, com-
prehensive and detailed estimate of the costs associated with the connection;
precise timetable for receipt and processing of the request for grid connection;
approximative timetable for any proposed grid connection).
150. Art. 16 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
151. Recital n° 61 suggests however that in such cases, it may be appropriate to provide a financial com-
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Member States may allow producers of electricity from renewable energy
sources wishing to be connected to the grid to issue a call for tender for the
connection work.
D / Measures concerning costs and tariffs
TSOs and DSOs have to set up and make public their standards rules relating to
the bearing and sharing of costs of technical adaptations, as well as their rules
on non-discriminatory implementation of the grid codes.152 The sharing of costs
is enforced by a mechanism based on objective, transparent and non-discrimi-
natory criteria taking into account the benefits which initially and subsequently
connected producers as well as TSOs and DSOs derive from the connections.
Where appropriate, Member States may require TSOs and DSOs to bear, in full
or in part, the costs of technical adaptation. They shall review and take the
necessary measures to improve the frameworks and rules for bearing and shar-
ing by 30 June 2011 and every two years thereafter to ensure the integration of
new producers.
Finally, Member States ensure that tariffs charged by TSOs and DSOs for the
transmission and distribution of electricity from plants using renewable energy
sources reflect realizable cost benefits resulting from the plant’s connection to
the network. Such cost benefits could arise from the direct use of the low-voltage
grid.
5.3.9. The specific regime for biofuels
Biofuel is defined by Directive 2009/28/EC as “liquid or gaseous fuel for trans-
port produced from biomass”.153
The use of biofuels provokes various problems, especially the use of biofuels of
first generation154. Some biofuels do not possess a sustainable character. They
can displace some traditional agricultural production or disrupt fragile zones.
This explains why many conditions for their use have been integrated in Direc-
tive 2009/28/EC. Only sustainably produced biofuels are allowed to count
towards the target and Directive 2009/28/EC proposes a comprehensive sustain-
ability and certification155 scheme. The industry is committed to strict but prac-
152. Art. 16, § 3 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
153. Art. 2, (i) of Directive 2009/28/29/EC.
154. See G. DE SANTI ed., Biofuels in the European context: facts and uncertainties, JRC, 2008; OECD,
Economic Assessment of Biofuel Support Policies, 2008 (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/62/
41007840.pdf).
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tical sustainability criteria that apply for domestic production as well as
imports.
Basically, the biofuels must firstly meet specified GHG savings. The savings must
reach at least 35% in 2010, 50% in 2017 and 60% in limited cases in 2018. The
methods for evaluating these savings are determined in article 19 and different
annexes. Biofuels may also not be produced from raw material obtained from
land of high biodiversity value, high carbon stocks or peatlands. Finally, as far
as they emanate from agricultural raw materials cultivated in the EU, their pro-
duction must comply with the EU environmental requirements on agricultural
production. The conclusion by the EU of “bilateral or multilateral agreements”
with third countries containing provisions on sustainability criteria that corre-
spond to those of Directive 2009/28/EC is also envisaged. The Commission may
then decide whether those agreements demonstrate that biofuels produced from
raw materials cultivated in those countries comply with the sustainability crite-
ria in question. It must be anticipated that the conclusion of such agreements, as
the conditions imposed by the EU, may raise important questions in the frame-
work of the WTO.
The monitoring on biofuels is based on a lot of reports that the European Com-
mission must submit regularly to the Council and the European Parliament. For
instance, the European Commission is required to report regularly on third
countries and Member States that are significant source of biofuels or of raw
material for biofuels consumed within the Community and on national meas-
ures taken to respect the sustainability criteria. It is also required to report reg-
ularly on the impact on social sustainability in the Community and in third
countries of increased demand for biofuel, on the impact of Community biofuel
policy on the availability of foodstuffs at affordable prices. Corrective action is
taken if necessary. The first reports have to be submitted in 2012.156 Other
numerous reports are also required from the European Commission.157
It should be noted that the sustainability and certification scheme for biofuels
also applies for bioliquids (solid and gaseous fuels used for other purposes than
transport (including electricity and heating and cooling produced from bio-
mass). The Commission had to report by December 2009 on the sustainability
requirements for the use of solid and gaseous biomass sources in electricity, heat-
ing and cooling. This report was presented158.
156. Art. 17, § 7 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
157. Art. 18, § 2; 19, § 2 and 4 to 6 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
158. COM (2010) 11. This report can be found on the following web site: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/
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A communication has been adopted by the Commission on the practical imple-
mentation of the EU biofuels and bioliquids sustainability scheme and on count-
ing rules for biofuels159. This sets out in a non binding way how Member States
and economic operators can implement the sustainability criteria and the
Renewable Energy Directive’s counting rules for biofuels in practice. It is
designed to facilitate a consistent implementation of the sustainability criteria.
It is accompanied by a communication on voluntary schemes and default values
in the EU biofuels and bioliquids sustainability scheme160, and also by Decision
2010/335/EU establishing guidelines for the calculation of land carbon stocks
for the purpose of Annex V to Directive 2009/28/EC161.
Finally, a specific provision for energy from biofuels in transport requires that
when the percentage of biofuels, blended in mineral oil derivatives, exceed 10%
by volume, Member States have to require this to be indicated at sales points.162
5.3.10. Link with the EEPR and the SET-Plan
The EEPR163 is a part of the European Economic Recovery Plan endorsed by the
European Council in December 2008164. It supports (renewable) energy
projects. Nine of them are offshore wind projects qualified for a total of €565
million. which received, following a European Commission’s decision taken on
9 December 2009, a financial assistance for a total of €1 billion165.
Pursuant to the European Council Conclusions of March 2007, the SET-Plan
creates a framework within which renewable energy development can be
brought forward. It selects six priority European Industrial initiatives (EIIs) on
the basis of various criteria166. Among others, they cover the areas of wind
energy, solar energy (PV and CSP), and bio-energy.
159. OJ 2010, C 160/9-16.
160. OJ 2010, C 160/1-8.
161. OJ 2010, L 151/19-41.
162. Art. 21, § 1 of Directive 2009/28/EC.
163. Regulation 663/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establish-
ing a programme to aid economic recovery by granting Community financial assistance to projects in the
field of energy (OJEU 2009, L 200/31).
164. The European Economic Recovery Plan foresees a financial assistance of €3.8 billion for energy
projects in the field of (1) CCS; (2) offshore wind energy; (3) gas and electricity infrastructure with the
aim to promote energy policy objectives as well as economic recovery and jobs.
165. To get this financial assistance, competitive procedures were organized (calls for proposals). On 9
December 2009, the European Commission selected 9 offshore wind projects (out of a total of 29 propos-
als). Details on each individual projects can be found on the following web site: http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/542&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLan-
guage=en
166. The criteria applied are the following ones: the EU added value and additionality; the willingness of
actors to join forces; the potential market penetration of the technology in different time horizons; the
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5.3.11. Impact
Directive 2009/28/EC establishes quite ambitious targets. Considering the
present threat provoked by a rapidly increasing external dependence of the EU
in the field of energy, this appears quite justified. Nonetheless, one must not
underestimate the difficulties this strategy will encounter167. The previous
results of Directive 2001/77/EC indicate that such targets are not easily reached,
that the time span of energy investments is quite long, that the period considered
(2009-2020) is quite short and that it is obviously more difficult to go from 10%
to 20% than from 0 to 10%. One must note however that conflicting analyses
exist. Some comments indicate that this target will be reached, and that the
economic benefits will be higher than expected168.
The volume of investments required by the implementation of Directive 2009/
28/EC will anyway be quite impressive, and the administrative problems quite
huge. Most probably, important subsidies and tax breaks will be required. The
implementation of the Directive in the Member States should be as rapid as
possible.
Finally, it seems that the potential of biofuels has been overestimated, at least in
the short term. The sustainability of first generation biofuels has been widely
contested169. Most probably, the production of second generation biofuels will
not be advanced enough to produce important results in 2020. Consequently, a
lot of efforts will have to be concentrated in the use of electricity in the transport
sector, if the specific 10% target is to be reached.
167. See R. LANE, Comparative Study on the Main Renewable Energy Support Mechanisms in European
Jurisdictions, 2010; ECOFYS at alii, Renewable energy policy country profile, 2009; GREEN, Climate-
change mitigation from renewable energy: its contribution and cost, in D. HELM and C. HEPBURN eds.,
The economics and politics of climate change, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009, 284-301.
168. See for example FRANHOFER et alii, The impact of renewable energy policy on economic growth
and employment in the European Union, 2009; G. ALVAREZ et alii, Study of the effects on employment
of public aid to renewable energy sources, 2009; S. TINDALE, How to meet the EU's 2020 renewables
targets, CER, 2009.
169. See for example JOANNEUM, The upfront carbon debt of bioenergy, 2010; DELFT, Biofuels: indi-
rect land use change and climate impact, 2010. A more nuanced approach is given by IFPRI, Global
Trade and Environmental Impact Study of the EU Biofuels Mandate, 2010; B. EICKHOUT et alii, Local
and global consequences of the EU renewable directive for biofuels, 2008.59
6. The Promotion of Carbon Capture and 
Storage
6.1. The role of Carbon Capture and Storage
Fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, coal) represent an important element of the energy
mix in the European Union as well as in many other economies. They are of
particular importance for the production of electricity (over 50% of EU electric-
ity come from fossil fuels). Their use releases however millions of tons of CO2
into the atmosphere, thereby accelerating global warming. To continue to rely
on fossil fuels as an important element of its energy mix, the EU must thus find
solutions to limit the impact of their use to levels compatible with its climate
objectives. Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), also known as carbon seques-
tration170, has the potential to play an important role from that point of view.
CCS is a technology in three phases171. (1) It catches CO2 produced by the burn-
ing of fossil fuels. (2) It transports it by pipelines or ships in certain cases to a
place of storage. (3) It injects it there in deep underground geological struc-
tures172 to store it. To these three phases, it is essential to add a post-injection
monitoring of the site ensuring the safety of the storage. CCS appears at the
moment of particular importance for installations involved in energy produc-
tion from fossil fuels that emit large amount of CO2 through their production
processes. In particular, installations using coal for generating electricity. Coal
currently accounts for about 30% of electricity generation in the EU and as the
dirtiest of all fossil fuels, it is responsible for 25% of all its CO2 emissions. This
said, from other perspectives, coal also presents considerable advantages com-
pared to oil and gas. The coal market is a well-functioning and relatively stable
world market. Coal prices have been lower and more stable than oil and gas
prices. Coal is also more widely available throughout the world (notably in
Europe), and thus can help to slow the increasing energy dependence of the EU.
The global demand for electricity will continue to strongly increase in the future
and so will the use of coal.173 The EU will be no exception to this global trend
towards higher electricity consumption. Therefore, if the EU wants coal to con-
170. Carbon sequestration is the general term for both natural and artificial processes that remove carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere.
171. Each phase can be achieved through a number of technologies.
172. Various types of geological storage are considered: (1) storage in depleted oil and gas reservoirs but
they are handicapped by their uneven distribution over the planet; (2) storage in deep saline aquifers
which seems the largest storage potential and which is the preferred storage of most of EU demonstration
projects in progress today; and (3) in unminable coal seams but this option seems marginal given its small
total world capacity. It may be attractive locally.
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tinue to make its valuable contribution to its energy security without thwarting
the achievement of its CO2 emission reduction target, it needs to develop tech-
nologies allowing for drastic reduction of the carbon footprint of its combustion.
Furthermore, if such technologies are developed on a sufficient scale to allow the
sustainable use of coal and are judged economically viable for commercial
deployment, they can also provide solutions for: (a) combustion processes using
other fossil fuels, including gas-fired power generation; and (b) other industrial
sectors already regulated by ETS such as cement, steel, refineries, pulp and paper.
CCS thus represents an unavoidable solution, within a portfolio of solutions (i.e.
energy efficiency, more renewable)174. This applies even if CCS does impose an
“energy penalty” since it requires extra energy to separate and capture the car-
bon dioxide. A coal or gas-fired power plant incorporating CCS technology will
use more fuel to produce electricity and operate more expensively than a plant
that simply releases the carbon dioxide into the air.
This said, the development of CCS will depend on a wide range of factors. If the
various components of the process (carbon, transport and storage) are well
developed, tested and practised on a small scale175, a large-scale use in power
generation in an integrated manner still needs to be demonstrated. Furthermore,
the costs remain prohibitive until now176. In addition, environmental impacts;
public and regulatory acceptance that geological storage is safe and efficient;
technology transfer and diffusion will also have to be taken into account. Estab-
lishing a carbon price will also be essential to stimulate the development of CCS.
Today, CCS costs are much higher than the price of CO2 on the EU ETS. They
could however considerably decrease in the future, mostly due to the construc-
tion of demonstration projects. Combined with an increasing cost of CO2 quo-
tas, in the future it will most probably be cheaper to invest in CCS rather than
to buy CO2 emission quotas.
174. See the Communication to the Council and the European, Parliament, Sustainable power generation
from fossil fuels: aiming for near-zero emissions from coal after 2020, COM(2006) 843, 10 January
2007, and Communication to the Council and the European Parliament – An energy policy for Europe,
COM(2007) 1, 10 January 2007.
175. CO2 capture is already practised on a small scale, while the technology for CO2 storage is almost
identical to that used by the oil and gas industry for decades – to store natural gas or for enhanced oil
recovery (EOR). In fact, it uses the same natural trapping mechanisms which have already kept huge vol-
umes of oil, gas and CO2 underground for millions of years. CO2 transportation is also well understood:
it has been shipped regionally for over 17 years, while a 4,000km onshore network has been operating in
the US for over 30 years.
176. Capturing CO2 is the most expensive part (roughly two thirds of total costs). Transporting CO2 is
the least expensive. Transport costs are however highly dependent on the distance between the plant and
the storage site and on whether the storage site is situated on or off shore. Storing CO2 is more expensive
than transporting it. If the storage is located offshore, costs will increase due to the more complicated
infrastructure and availability. Monitoring storage integrity after injection also entails a cost that should
be taken into account. These costs are however expected to substantially decrease as CCS technology
moves from the demonstration phase (2015) to the commercial scale (2020 at the earliest without delay –
2030 if delay). On this point, see the 2008 McKinsey CCS report: “Assessing the Economics”.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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Acting on the fact that work still has to be carried out to develop CCS, the
European Commission took different initiatives.
6.2. The Commission’s first initiatives
For a few years now, the European Commission has started a dialogue with
stakeholders (scientists, environmentalists, industry) on the matter of CCS and
several interest groups have been formed.
The 2005 Commission Communication ‘Winning the battle against climate
change’177 announced the Second European Climate Change Programme (ECCP
II) and pointed out that it would address carbon capture and storage. A working
group on CCS was then set up to explore CCS as a means of mitigating climate
change. In June 2006, it adopted a report recommending the issuance by the
Commission of a communication outlining the major EU policy choices for CCS
accompanied by a proposal for an EU CSS regulatory framework178. It also rec-
ommended that CCS activities be recognised in the EU ETS. In 2007, Member
States and stakeholders were consulted179. In 2008, the European Commission
presented a communication entitled “Supporting early demonstration of sus-
tainable power generation from fossil fuels”180 in which the Commission
announced under FP7 to create and animate a network of CCS projects (set up
in 2010), and a proposal for a Directive on the geological storage of carbon
dioxide as part of a larger package on energy and climate change.
In 2005, a platform called ZEP (Zero Emissions Fossil Fuel Power Plants) was
also established by the European Commission. ZEP is one of the 35 technology
platforms initiated by the European Commission to bring together a range of
stakeholders to guide the development and deployment of key technologies.181
ZEP’s goal is to develop EU fossil fuel plants with zero CO2 emission by 2020.
In 2006, it presented a Strategic Research Agenda (SRA) as well as a Strategic
Deployment Document (SDD) necessary to achieve its goal. In 2008, it unveiled
a proposal for an “EU demonstration programme”182 of large-scale CCS dem-
177. COM(2005) 35.
178. See http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/env/eccp_2/library?l=/geological_storage&vm=detailed&sb=Title
(accessed 18 August 2009).
179. See the two introductory reports: Choices for regulating CO2 capture and storage in the EU, 2007
and Incentivising CO2 capture and storage in the European Union, 2007.
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/ccs/pdf/policy_options_paper.pdf. (accessed 18 August 2009).
180. COM(2008)13.
181. More information the existing technology platforms can be found on the following web site: http://
cordis.europa.eu@technology-platforms/
182. The EU demonstration programme was previously named the « EU Flagship programme ». It can be
found on the following web site: http://www.zero-emissionplatform.eu/website/docs/ETP%20ZEP/
EU%20Demonstration%20Programme%20for%20CCS%20-%20ZEP%27s%20Proposal.pdfTHE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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onstration in response to the 2007 European Council’s invitation. This pro-
gramme foresees that 10-12 projects would be necessary and make the technol-
ogy commercially available by 2020. It also identifies the need, in addition to
the industry participation, of €12 billion complementary public funding. The
CCS projects which will be incorporated in the EU demonstration programme
will have to be in line with the framework and selection criteria developed by
ZEP. The programme also forecasts that, depending on the aggressiveness of the
roll-out, between 80-120 commercial projects could be operational in Europe
by 2030 and, by 2050, CCS could reduce CO2 emissions in the EU by 0.6-1.7
billion tonnes a year.
These promising perspectives have been contested. According to some analyses,
governments wanting to use CCS have overestimated its value and that it would
take a reservoir the size of a small US state to hold the CO2 produced by one
power station. In other words, space needed to store CO2 has been hugely
underestimated183.
6.3. Directive 2009/31/EC
Directive 2009/31/EC covers essentially one particular part of CCS, namely geo-
logical storage. Geological storage refers to the injection of CO2 in underground
geological formations. Its main purpose is to establish a favourable legal frame-
work to ensure environmentally safe storage of CO2 in geological formations
without risk for human health. It thereby aims at removing the existing barriers
in EU legislation. To that extent, it amends several EU legislative texts184. The
number of these legislations reflects the complexity of the matter.
Directive 2009/31/EC indicates where such CO2 storage is not allowed. It also
defines what is meant by geological storage of CO2 and other important
notions.185 It confirms that only Member States have the right to determine the
areas from which sites may be selected. This includes the right not to allow for
183. For different approaches, see for example STANGELAND, Why CO2 Capture and Storage (CCS) is
an Important Strategy to Reduce Global CO2 Emissions, Bellona, 2007; EHLIG-ECONOMIDES and
ECONOMIDES, Sequestering carbon dioxide in a closed underground volume, Journal of Petroleum Sci-
ence and Engineering 70 (2010) 123-130.
184. See Art. 31 to 37 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
This concerns Directive 2008/1/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and control; Directive 85/
337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment;
Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of envi-
ronmental damage; Directive 2006/12/EC on waste; Regulation 1013/2006/EC on shipments of waste;
Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, and
Directive 2001/80/EC on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combus-
tion plants.
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any storage in parts or in the whole of their territory.186 Member States ensure
that exploration permits, where necessary for a site selection, are delivered.187
They also ensure that no storage site is operated without a storage permit.188
Priority for the granting of a storage permit for a particular site can be given to
the holder of the exploration permit provided certain conditions are fulfilled.
The contents of permit applications and the contents of storage permits are
defined by Directive 2009/31/EC.189
The European Commision receives the draft storage permits within one month
after receipt by Member States. Within four months after receipt of the draft
storage permit, the Commission may issue a non-binding decision on it. If the
Commission decides not to issue an opinion, it informs the Member State. The
national competent authority must notify the final decision to the Commission
and must state its reasons where it departs from the Commission opinion.190 A
storage permit can be issued only if the conditions indicated in Directive 2009/
31/EC are fulfilled.
Directive 2009/31/EC also contains provisions on changes, review, update and
withdrawals of storage permits.191 It also determines obligations linked to the
operation, closure and post-closure of storage sites.192 These obligations are
imposed, on the one hand, to operators of a storage site and, on the other hand,
to the competent authorities responsible for monitoring.
Measures to ensure potential users are able to obtain access to transport net-
works and to storage sites for the purpose of geological storage of the produced
and capture CO2 m u s t  b e  t a k e n  b y  M e m b e r  S t a t e s . 193 Dispute settlement
arrangements have also to be put in place to enable disputes relating to access
to transport networks and to storage sites.194 A register of the storage permits
granted has also to be established.195 Environmental information relating to te
geological storage of CO2 has to be made available to the public.196
186. Art. 4 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
187. Art. 5 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
188. Art. 6 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
189. Art. 7 and 8 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
190. Art. 10 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
191. Art. 11 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
192. Chapter 4 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
193. Art. 21 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
194. Art. 22 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
195. Art. 24 of Directive 2009/31/EC.
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6.4. Financial support
Today, CCS is already happening worldwide. They are a lot of CCS research
projects but only a few large-scale commercial CCS projects are in operation.
Three large-scale commercial projects in operation have been undertaken by
European corporations: the “Sleipner project” in the North Sea undertaken by
Statoil since 1996; the “In Salah project” in Algeria undertaken by Statoil, BP
and Sonatrach since 2004; the “Snøhvit project” in the Barents Sea undertaken
by Stateoil since 2008. All of them involve stripping CO2 from natural gas and
storing it in underground geological formations197. None of them include CO2
capture from power plants. Instead, the CO2 in these three projects is separated
from of mixture of natural gas and CO2, which is a much simpler operation than
capturing CO2 from power plant flue gas. Other projects give more perspectives,
but they are not as advanced. Three European pilot CCS projects include this
time CO2 capture from power plants: the “Castor project” in Esbjerg (Dene-
mark) undertaken by Elsam since 2006, the Vattenfall project at Schwarze
Pumpe (Germany) since 2008 and the Total CCS project in the Lacq basin in
France since 2007.
The costs of all these projects are quite substantial. This puts the brakes on new
CCS projects and technology developments. Hence, sufficient and timely finan-
cial resources are a key element and, from this point of view, public funds can
be needed. At the EU level, a few instruments already exist to compensate the
costs for actors developing CCS: (a) the EU general programmes [such as Intel-
ligent Energy-Europe Programme or the Framework Programme in its seventh
stage now (FP7) or the EU Cohesion and structural funds]; (b) the revised state
aid guidelines for environmental protection allowing EU countries to subsidize
CCS; (c) the EIB products for financing CCS. Recently, two new specific finan-
cial programmes for the support of CCS demonstration projects have been
developed: the European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) and the New
Entrants Reserve fund (NER300).
The EEPR198 is part of the European Economic Recovery Plan endorsed by the
European Council in December 2008199. It supports energy projects. Six of them
are CCS projects which received, following a European Commission’s decision
197. One can notice that, in all these projects, Stateoil (the Norwegian oil and gas company) is present. In
addition, all these projects are located outside the territory of the EU.
198. Regulation 663/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establish-
ing a programme to aid economic recovery by granting Community financial assistance to projects in the
field of energy (OJEU 2009, L 200/31).
199. The European Economic Recovery Plan foresees a financial assistance of €3.8 billion for energy
projects in the field of (1) CCS; (2) offshore wind energy; (3) gas and electricity infrastructure with the
aim to promote energy policy objectives as well as economic recovery and jobs.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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taken on 9 December 2009, a financial assistance for a total of €1 billion200.
Five out of the six selected CCS projects concern coal fired power plants. For
each project, up to 50% of eligible costs are covered. According to the European
Commission in its most recent report on the progress of the EEPR, and in order
that these projects are successfully completed, several issues will need to be care-
fully monitored. Firstly, continued national funding and industrial commitment
will be necessary. Secondly, Member States need to provide the necessary legal
framework for CO2 storage by transposing the CCS Directive into national law.
This will avoid delays in the delivery of CO2 storage authorization and ulti-
mately in the timely approval of the final investment decision. Finally, public
awareness of CO2 storage safety should be properly addressed as this is critical
in the implementation of the CCS projects.201
The NER is managed jointly by the European Commission, the European
Investment Bank and the EU Member States. In the NER300, 300 million allow-
ances (rights to emit one ton of carbon dioxide) in the so-called New Entrants’
Reserve of the EU ETS202 are set aside until 31 December 2015 to support com-
mercial CCS demonstration projects and demonstration projects of innovative
renewable technologies in the territory of the European Union. These allow-
ances will be sold by the EIB on the carbon market and the money raised (esti-
mated to about 6 billion if the carbon price is 20 euros/ton203) will be made
available to finance the selected projects. The money will be awarded through
two rounds of calls for proposals organized by the European Commission.
Award decisions for the first round should be issued by 31 December 2011 and
for the second round by 31 December 2013. The final adoption of a decision
(“NER300 decision”) containing the criteria and measures for allocating the
300 million allowances was still awaited in July 2010.
NER 300 has fixed a total of 12 commercial demonstration projects. NER 300
will most likely finance a minimum of 8 CCS projects in four categories (oxy-
fuel, precombustion, postcombustion and industrial applications). For each
project, up to 50% of eligible costs will be covered. Member States keep a cru-
cial role in the process. They are responsible for collecting funding applications
200. To get this financial assistance, competitive procedures were organized (calls for proposals). On 9
December 2009, the European Commission selected six 6 CCS projects (out of a total of 12 proposals).
The six chosen projects are: Vattenfall’s Jaenshwalde power plant in Germany; Endesa’s Compostilla plan
in Spain; Maasvlakte plant in the Netherlands; Hatfield in the United Kingdom; Belchatow in Poland;
Enel’s Porto-Tolle plant in Italy. Each of them will receive €180 million, except Enel’s Porto-Tolle plant
which will receive €100 million. Details on each individual projects can be found on the following web
site: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/542&format=HTML&aged=0
&language=en&guiLanguage=en
201. Report from te Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of
the European Energy Programme for Recovery, COM (2010) 191, p.9.
202. New art. 10a, 8 of Directive 2003/87/EC.
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and for assessing the demonstration projects on the basis of the eligibility crite-
ria. However, no more than three projects can take place within a Member State.
The money raised by the sale of allowances by the EIB will also be passed on to
the relevant Member States for disbursement. Financing under the NER300 can
be combined with other European Community funding, notably the EEPR;
However, combined funding under the NER300 and EEPR shall amount no
more than 50% of eligible costs.
Finally, as proposed by the European Commission, financial support could also
be brought in the future by including CO2 infrastructure (pipelines and storage
sites) in the TEN-E guidelines under revision. Indeed, the commercialization of
CCS from fossil fuel power plants requires an infrastructure for the transporta-
tion of the captured CO2 from the source of emission to the storage sites. The
Commission has also addressed the issue of resources for CCS development in
its communication on financing low-carbon technologies planned under the
SET-Plan204.
6.5. Link with other regulatory topics
6.5.1. The revised ETS Directive
As far as the revised ETS Directive is concerned, stored CO2 emissions will be
considered as “not emitted” as from 2013.205
6.5.2. Regulation 736/96/EC
A proposal concerning investment in energy infrastructure aims at repealing
Regulation 736/96/EC206. It establishes a common framework for the notifica-
tion to the Commission by Member States every two years of data and informa-
tion on investment projects energy infrastructure (production, transport, stor-
age) in the petroleum, gas, electricity and biofuel sectors, as well as on invest-
ment projects (transport or storage) related to carbon dioxide produced by these
sectors.
204. COM(2009) 519.
205. Art. 12, 3a of Directive 2003/87/EC as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC.
206. The latest version of the proposal can be found in the Council document 6687/10 – ENER 45 dated
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6.5.3. The SET-plan
Pursuant to the European Council Conclusions of March 2007, the SET-Plan
creates a framework within which CCS development can be brought forward. It
identifies CCS as one of the strategic energy technologies and sets the time hori-
zon of 2020 for making its use in power generation a realistic option. CCS dem-
onstration can thus be a new case of a European Industrial Initiative (EII) under
the SET-Plan.
6.5.4. No acknowledgment of CCS in the framework of CDM
During the climate talks in Copenhagen, some countries proposed to add CCS
to the UN Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows companies in
rich countries to fulfill part of their climate obligations by investing in emission
reductions in developing countries. Other countries however expressed concerns
regarding the implication of this possible inclusion and highlighted a number of
unresolved issues (risks of seepage from storage sites and liability issues in the
event of leakage).
Finally, no consensus was reached and CCS will not be taken into account under
CDM. UNFCCC’s scientific advisory body was tasked to further investigate and
report at the next conference in Mexico in 2010 or in South Africa in 2011.
This is obviously no good news for various actors involved. The EU approved
€1 billion of economic recovery funding to support six demonstration projects.
In some countries, electricity is strongly generated from fossil fuel. For instance,
in Poland and the UK, coal provides respectively 94% and 33% of the electric-
ity. Finally, there are countries where fossil fuel reserve such as coal are located
or for industries relying heavily on coal inputs such as the steel industry.69
7. The Framework on Environmental Subsidies
7.1. The previous guidelines on state aid for 
environmental protection
The first guidelines on state aid for environmental protection, promoting sus-
tainable development were adopted by the Commission in 1994207. However,
during the period between 1994 and 2000, a lot of environmental actions were
taken in the field of environment by the Member States and the European Com-
munity. The Kyoto Protocol was also adopted at a world level. New forms of
operating aids were in addition on the increase, especially in the energy sector.
Consequently, new guidelines were needed, in particular to further promote sus-
tainable development without having disproportionate effects on competition
and economic growth. These new guidelines entered into force in 2001 (hereaf-
ter “the 2001 guidelines”)208.
According to the “polluter pays” principle, the entity responsible for environ-
mental pollution must bear the environmental costs. This principle also implies
that environmental costs should be internalised, that is to say they should be
included in the companies production costs. The 2001 guidelines implement
this. They also emphasize that the implementation of the polluter pays principle
coincides with the implementation of the banning of state aid. In other words,
the granting of state aid is in theory not compatible with the polluter pays prin-
ciple. Nevertheless, the 2001 guidelines stipulate that the granting of state aid
may be authorized, under specific conditions, in the form of investment aid or
operating aid, in cases where the aid gives enterprises an incentive to invest in a
high level of environmental protection.
All sectors governed by the EC treaty are covered by the 2001 guidelines, with
the exception of the agriculture sector. State aid for R & D in the environmental
field and for environmental training activities falls however respectively under
the scope of the Community framework for State aid for research and develop-
ment209 and the Commission regulations N° 68/2001 of January 2001 on the
application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC treaty to training aid210. The 2001
guidelines do not apply either to stranded costs.
The 2001 guidelines define several categories of state aid which are acceptable.
207. OJEC 1994, C 72/3.
208. OJEC 2001, C 37/3.
209. OJEC 1996, C 45/5.
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7.1.1. Investment aid
a. aid for undertaking which go beyond Community standard or which
increase the level of environmental protection in the absence of a mandatory
Community standard. This category of aid is authorized up to 30% gross of
the eligible investment costs. In other words, aid for undertaking to be in line
with a new or an existing compulsory Community standard is forbidden,
except in the case of SMEs. The latter may obtain within a limited period of
time state aid up to a maximum of 15% gross of the eligible costs in order
to meet a new compulsory Community standard;
b. aid in energy to promote energy savings, combined production of heat and
electric power, renewable sources of energy. The basic rate for such aid is
40% of eligible costs. This said, for renewable sources of energy, the rate of
aid may be extended to 50% of eligible costs if the investment supplied an
entire community and up to 100% when shown to be necessary;
c. aid for rehabilitation of polluted industrial sites. Such aid may be authorised
up to 100% of the eligible costs plus 15% of the costs of the work;
d. aid for relocation of undertaking to a new site. Such aid is not authorized
except when the activities of the undertaking create major pollution where it
is established (precisely in an urban area or in a Natura 2000 designated
area). In that case the aid may amount to up to 30% gross of the eligible
investment costs;
e. aid to help SMEs for advisory/consultancy services in the environmental
field. Such aid may be granted under the provisions of regulation EC No. 70/
2001211;
f. bonuses to firms located in assisted regions or to SMEs. These bonuses may
be given as additional aid. For firms located in assisted regions, two options
are proposed: either the basic aid rate already mentioned plus 5% points
gross in the regions covered by Article 87 (3), c) and 10 percentage points in
the regions covered by Article 87 (3) a) or the regional aid rate plus 10%
points gross. For SMEs, a 10% points gross may be authorized. The bonuses
for assisted regions and SMEs may be combined but the maximum rate aid
may never exceed 100% gross of the eligible costs.
7.1.2. Operating aid
g. aid to promote waste management. Such aid must comply with the classifi-
cation of the principles of waste management212 and may only be granted
211. Commission regulation (EC) No. 70/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and
88 of the EC Treaty to state aid for small and medium-sized enterprises (OJEC 2001, L 10/33).
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when “absolutely necessary”. Firstly, the aid is strictly limited to compensat-
ing for extra production costs by comparison with the market prices of the
relevant products or services. Secondly, the aid is temporary. Thirdly, the aid
may be granted for a period of 5 years, where the aid is degressive (100% of
the extra costs in the first year but they must have fallen in a linear fashion
to zero by the end of the fifth year). In the case of a non degressive aid, its
duration is limited to five years and its intensity must not exceed 50% of the
extra costs;
h. aid under the form of national temporary tax exemptions or reductions.
Such temporary tax exemptions or reductions can be granted in two circum-
stances. Firstly, a tax is levied by a Member State in the absence of a Com-
munity directive for reasons of environmental protection. In that case, a tax
exemption may be granted temporarily to firms affected in order to allow
them to adopt rapidly to the new tax burden. Secondly, the tax is levied by a
Member State as the result of a Community directive. In that case, there are
two Scenarios. On the one hand, if the national tax rate is higher than the
minimum rate laid down in the Community directive, a temporary tax
exemption may be granted to affected firm with the result that they pay the
tax at a rate lower but at least equal to the minimum rate set by the Commu-
nity Directive. On the other hand, if the national tax rate is equal to the
minimum rate laid down in the Community directive and if the national tem-
porary tax exemption granted to affected firms has as result that they pay the
tax at a lower rate than the minimum rate set by the Community Directive,
such a temporary tax exemption constitutes a forbidden aid, unless it is
authorized by the Community directive itself and considered “necessary”
and not “disproportionate in the light of the Community objectives pur-
sued”.
Furthermore, national tax exemption covering a 10-year period with no
degressivity may be authorized under the conditions fixed by the 2001 guide-
lines when a Member State has adopted a tax in a sector of activity or on
products for environmental reason and that the tax concerned is not foreseen
by Community legislation or exceeds the one laid down by Community leg-
islation,
i. aid in energy (renewable energy sources, combined production of heat and
electric power). Member States may grant, according to four options
described in the 2001 guidelines, an aid which covers the difference between
the cost of producing energy from renewable energy sources and its market
price. Member States may also grant to firms for the production of combined
electric power and heat aid in the same way as for renewable energies sources
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7.2. The new 2008 guidelines on state aid for 
environmental protection
The revised state aid guidelines213 adopted by the Commission entered into
force beginning of April 2008. They replace the one of 2001214 and will be
applicable until 31 December 2014. They set out how Member States may grant
environmental aid to ease the burden of the shift to a low-carbon economy. Here
too, they apply to state aid to support environmental protection in all sectors
governed by the EC Treaty unless specific rules provide otherwise. However, the
financing of environmental protection measures relating to air, road, railway,
inland waterway and maritime transport infrastructure, including any project of
common interest as identified in Decision n° 1692/96/EC215 is not covered by
the guidelines. Moreover State aid research, development and innovation in the
environmental field is subject to the rules set out in the Community framework
for State aid for research and development and innovation216 The market diffu-
sion stage of eco-innovation (acquisition of an eco-innovation asset) is covered
by the guidelines.
Compared to previous guidelines, these encompass broader measures. The
measures covered by the 2008 guidelines are: aid for early adaptation to stand-
ards or to go beyond mandatory standards, aid for acquisition of clean transport
vehicule, aid for environmental studies, aid for energy saving, aid for renewable
energy resources (including biofuels respecting the sustainability criteria), aid
for cogeneration and for district heating, aid for waste management; aid for the
remediation of contaminated sites; aid for the relocation of undertaking, aid
involved in tradable permit schemes, aid in the form of reductions of or exemp-
tions from environmental taxes.
Compared to previous guidelines, the 2008 guidelines also allow generally for
higher amounts of aid. The aid intensities can go for large enterprises to a max-
imum of 60% of the eligible investment cost, for medium-sized enterprises to a
maximum of 70% of the eligible investment cost and for small enterprises to a
maximum of 80% of the eligible investment cost. In general, the aid intensity
percentage increases when the aid is given to SMEs. In addition, if enterprises
have obtained the aid through a competitive bidding process, they may even
claim up to 100% of the eligible investment cost. Up to 100% of the eligible
investment cost can also be claimed for the remediation of contaminated sites.
213. Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection (OJEU 2008, C82/1).
214. OJEC 2001, C 37/3.
215. Decision 1692/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 on Commu-
nity guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network (OJEC 1996, L 228/1). This
decision has been amended several times.
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Contrary to the 2001 guidelines, there is no longer a bonus for aid to assisted
regions or for renewable energy installations serving all needs in an entire com-
munity.
The 2008 guidelines maintain the possibility of state aids in the form of tax
reductions and exemptions from harmonised environmental taxes provided the
beneficiaries pay at least the community minimum tax level, that is to say the
minimum level of taxation provided for in Community legislation. For energy
products and electricity, the minimum level of taxation is laid down in Annex I
to Council Directive 2003/96/EC217. Where the companies do not pay at least
the community minimum tax level, the Member States must demonstrate that
the state aid is necessary and proportionate.
The guidelines foresee two types of assessment method: standard assessment
and detailed assessment. The latter allows for deeper examination and is used
when large aid amounts to individual enterprises are involved. Schemes involv-
ing tax exemptions and reductions will only be assessed at level of the scheme –
that is, individual enterprises will not be subject to a detailed assessment.
Finally, there is a link between the 2008 guidelines and the Commission General
Block Exemption Regulation n° 800/2008218. This regulation will relieve the
Member States from the obligation to notify certain aid measures to the EC, and
thus reduce the administrative burden. It is foreseen that certain types of envi-
ronmental protection aid under a certain amount will not have to be notified to
the EC in the future. In addition, under the block exemption, a simplified
method can be used to calculate the aid amount.
217. Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation
of energy products and electricity (OJEU 2003, L 283). This Directive has been amended several times.
218. Commission Regulation n° 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compati-
ble with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption
Regulation) (OJEU 2008, L 214/3).75
8. Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency was not initially an element of the climate package proposals.
This seemed paradoxical since it remains probably the most important remedy
to the problem. The most environment friendly energy unit is certainly the one
which is not spent (sometimes called the “white energy”)219. From a communi-
cation point of view, this absence was especially puzzling, if one considers that
the EU energy sector must deal with other challenges than climate warming220.
However, during the 2008 negotiations of the climate package, this weakness
has been corrected. A new provision about energy efficiency (art. 4) was inserted
in Decision 406/2009/EC. It restates the objective of a 20% reduction of energy
consumption for 2020221.
8.1. The 2006 plan
The 1970s have shown that huge processes in energy efficiency are possible.
These progresses were certainly not voluntary but imposed by the two oil
shocks. During this period, the energy intensity of GNP has substantially
declined in the developed world, especially in Europe and Japan. Unfortunately,
the strength of this evolution has substantially diminished after the reduction of
oil prices during the 1980s.
An EU energy efficiency action plan was adopted in 2000222. A few legislative
measures were adopted during the next years. In 2005, the Commission opened
a wide-ranging debate with a Green Paper on energy efficiency223. The Green
Paper placed energy savings at the centre of the EU’s ambitions to boost com-
petitiveness and jobs (the Lisbon strategy) saying it could:
• save at least 20% of its present energy consumption by 2020, or the equiva-
lent of €60 billion a year;
• contribute to reducing Europe’s dependence on oil and gas imports as prices
of fossil fuels continued to surge;
219. According to a 2009 study, the potentials of a low policy intensity may reach 15% for the EU27 in
2020 and 22% in 2030. For a high policy intensity, the potentials could reach 22% in 2020 and 33% in
2030 (see Fraunhoffer Institute et alii, Study on the Energy Savings Potentials in EU Member States, Can-
didate Countries and EEA Countries Final Report, 2009, p. 9. See also S. Lechtenböhmer et alii, Energy
Efficiency as a key element of the EU’s Post-Kyoto Strategy – Results of an Integrated Scenario Analysis,
2005.
220. See F. Dehousse, The Coming Energy Crash and its Impact on the European Union, Egmont Paper
n°17, Egmont Institute, 2008.
221. The 20/20/20 strategy did not become however the 20/20/20/20 Strategy.
222. See COM (1998) 246 and the action plan adopted by the Council in 2000 (Bull. EU, 12-2000, pt.
1.4.50).
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• be the quickest and most cost-effective manner to reduce GHG emissions
and help the EU meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol on climate
change.
According to the Commission, half of the savings mentioned in the paper could
be met by simply improving the enforcement of existing legislation. The remain-
ing 10% would need to come from innovative solutions. The European Council
endorsed the Commission’s proposals in 2006. So a new energy efficiency action
plan was proposed by the Commission in 2006, promoting 20% energy saving
potentials by 2020224. The Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (EEAP) was
approved by the Council225. The plan’s running time is until 2012. It outlines a
framework of policies and measures and targets as priorities the residential
(households) and commercial tertiary buildings (with savings potentials esti-
mated at 27% and 30% respectively), the manufacturing industry (with the
potential for a 25% reduction), and transport (with the potential for a 26%
reduction in energy consumption). Ten priorities are identified in the 2006 effi-
ciency action plan.
The first priority is clearly to energise equipment labelling and minimum energy
performance standards for appliances and other energy-using equipment on the
basis of the labelling and eco-design directives. Special attention is given con-
cerning minimum energy performance standards to 14 priority products groups
(including boilers, water heaters, consumer electronics, copying machines, tele-
visions, standby modes, chargers, lighting, electric motors and other products).
This implies a revision of Directive 92/75/EEC on labelling226 to strengthen it
and enlarge its scope (for instance to commercial refrigeration) and the use of
the provisions of Directive 2006/32/EC on energy end-use efficiency and energy
services227 to draft guidelines, a code of conduct and a certification procedure
applicable to all sectors.
The second priority aims at substantially reducing heat loss in buildings, as well
as at extending the scope Directive 2002/91/EC on energy performance of build-
ings to cover small buildings, to develop minimum performance standards appli-
cable to new and renovated buildings and to promote so-called “passive”
houses. The third priority consists of making power generation and distribution
more efficient by developing minimum binding efficiency requirements for new
electricity, heating and cooling capacity lower than 20 MW and by considering,
if necessary, such requirements for larger production units. In addition, the
224. COM (2006) 545.
225. Bull. EU, 11/2006, pt. 1.23.4.
226. OJ 1992, L 297/16.
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development of a new regulatory framework to promote the connection of
decentralized generation is announced.
The fourth priority concerns the transport sector, notably to address energy effi-
ciency and CO2 emissions from cars to ensure that 120 g CO2/km target is
achieved by 2012 and to propose to strengthen EU requirements for labelling of
cars to incentivize consumers and producers towards more efficient vehicles
through the amendment of Directive 1999/94/EC. Consideration is also given to
a European Norm and international standard for maximum rolling resistance
limits and labelling for road vehicles tyres, as tyres and tyre pressure can
improve vehicule fuel efficiency by more than 5%. To finish on transport, mar-
ket-based instruments for the maritime sector and measures to include the avia-
tion sector in the EU ETS are also considered as well as the elaboration of a
green paper on urban transport to develop alternatives to car transport.
The fifth priority bears on facilitating appropriate financing of energy efficiency
investments for SMEs and Energy Service Companies. The sixth priority aims at
boosting energy efficiency within the framework of the Cohesion Policy, in par-
ticular in the new Member States. The promotion of networking between Mem-
ber States and regions is also underlined to ensure financing of best practice in
energy efficiency. The seventh priority promotes a coherent use of taxation,
notably by preparing a Green Paper on indirect taxation and subsequently by
reviewing Directive 2003/96/CE (called “the Energy Tax Directive”). As regards
vehicle taxation, Member States are also requested to adopt as soon as possible
the Commission’s proposal to relate taxation to CO2 performance228.
The eighth priority consits of raising efficiency awareness through education,
training plans and programs, in particular for energy managers in industry and
utilities. The ninth priority concerns the creation of a “covenant of mayors”
bringing together in a permanent network the mayors of 20-30 of Europe’s larg-
est and most pioneering cities in view of exchanging best practices. Finally, the
tenth priority aims at fostering energy efficiency worldwide through framework
agreements with key external trading partner countries (Brazil, China, India,
Japan, Russia and the United States) and international organization.This has to
be done in collaboration with international institutions.
One can see that the most important priorities announced in this program were
of a legislative nature. Revealingly, their adoption has not always been easy since
2007. Moreover, in general the implementation of the Community existing
energy efficiency legislation is poor in Member States.
228. COM (2005) 261.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
78
From this point of view, an interesting development was the presentation by the
Commission of the first assessment of national energy efficiency action plans
(NEEAPs) as required by Directive 2006/32/EC on energy end-use efficiency and
energy services229. This assessment provides a first overview of the strategies
presented by the Member States. Though providing encouraging signs, this
assessment reveals a considerable gap in several Member States between the
political commitment to energy efficiency and the measures adopted or planned,
as reported in the NEEAPs, and the resources attributed to preparing it. The
Commission’s communication entitled “energy efficiency: delivering 20% tar-
get”230, published end of 2008, confirms the gap between the Member States’
political commitment to energy efficiency and their actions. It stresses that only
one third of the actions foreseen in the 2006 action plan have been completed
and that the remainder are ongoing and still need active commitment both at EU
and national levels. Finally, it concludes that though some progress have been
made, there is a risk of not meeting the 20% energy saving target by 2020 if
energy saving potentials is not being realized fast enough. Indeed, there are
strong indications that measures already adopted by the EU should only achieve
energy saving of about 13% by 2020, even if properly implemented by Member
States.
The results of the public consultation are contained in a Commission's docu-
ment dated August 2009 entitled “Evaluation and revisions of the action plan
for energy efficiency – Report on the public consultation June-August 2009”.
8.2. The EU energy security and solidarity action plan
In 2008, the second strategic energy review was launched231. It focused on secu-
rity of energy supply. The basis of the analysis lies in the growing dependence of
the EU. That is mainly why the Commission proposed to adopt a new action
plan, called the “EU energy security and solidarity action plan (ESSA plan)”232.
This ESSA plan defines priorities. Among these priorities, the improvement of
energy efficiency by a bunch of legislative revisions in view to make energy sav-
ings in key areas. These key areas were the following (a) improvement in the
legislation on the energy performance of buildings and (b) intensification of the
implementation of ecodesign and cogeneration Directives. A new Sustainable
Energy Financing Initiative is also prepared jointly with the EIB and the finan-
229. COM (2008) 11.
230. COM (2008) 772.
231. This document has not an official reference yet. Two accompanying technical documents are SEC
(2008) 2794 and 2795.
232. Second Strategic Energy Review – An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan [COM/2008/
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cial organisations to mobilise large-scale funding from capital markets for
investments in energy efficiency as well as renewable energies, clean use of fossil
fuels and combined heat and power from renewable in Europe’s cities.
In 2009, the European Council approved the EESA plan233, further refined in
the Council (TTE) conclusions of 19 February 2009234. At that occasion, the
European Council invited the European Commission to rapidly propose a revi-
sion of the energy efficiency action plan. Evaluation is ongoing and the Commis-
sion intends to deliver a new energy efficiency action plan in 2011.
8.3. Adopted energy efficiency measures
Though the EU has struggled to get targets and action straight, some measures
have been adopted in 2009 and 2010. They are numerous and it is not possible
to describe all of them them.
Directive 2009/125/EC establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign
requirements for energy-related products is an important milestone235. It has
enlarged the scope of Directive 2005/32/EC that covered only energy-using
products236. The requirements on the individual product groups are set in imple-
menting regulations. In that framework, the Commission’s Regulation 244/
2009/EC implementing Directive 2005/32/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council with regard to ecodesign requirements for non-directional house-
hold lamps was quite symbolical237. The manufacture and import of all ineffi-
cient non-clear (non-transparent, also known as pearl or frosted) lamps, which
is deemed the most wasteful, has been banned. After three years, all incandes-
cent bulbs, which generate more heat than light, will be phased out completely.
There was also an important agreement in 2010 between the Parliament and the
Council concerning two main texts. Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy perform-
ance of buildings238 requires all new buildings to be “nearly zero” energy by 2021
and new buildings owned or rented by public authorities by 2019. Directive 2010/
30/EU on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the
consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products239 extends
233. Presidency conclusions of 19-20 March, 2009 – Document 7880/1/09 rev. 1 of 29 April 2009.
234. See the conclusions of the 2924th Council meeting of transport, telecommunications and energy of
19 February 2009 – document 6670/09.
235. OJ 2009, L 285/10-35.
236. OJ 2005, L 191/29.
237. OJ 2009, L 76/3-16.
238. OJ 2010, L 153/13-35.
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the scope of existing EU laws from household appliances to cover all energy-
related products as well as energy-consuming commercial and industrial products
like cold storage rooms or vending machines. In addition, last year’s compromise
added three more classes to the existing A-G labelling format in order to distin-
guish between several different ‘A’ classes, in which a large number of products
have ended up as technology has developed.
On the reverse, the long discussions about setting minimum energy efficiency
standards for boilers, which began in 2007, have not produced a result yet. The
deadline, initially in 2009, has already been reported twice, and the Commission
is now hoping for a vote of the national experts at the beginning of 2011. Gas
and oil-fired central heating boilers are estimated to be responsible for 17% of
the EU’s CO2 emissions in 2005, making them an important contributor to cli-
mate change.
8.4. Link with ICT
There are multiple ways by which Information and Communication technolo-
gies (ICT) can improve energy efficiency.
On one side, ICTs are routinely employed, for instance, in the monitoring and
control of energy-use buildings. ICTs also turn the traditional energy meter into
an ICT device capable of collecting and communicating a live stream of data and
other information on their energy use to consumers. Such information can in
turn be used by consumers to help them better understand how much energy
they consume and where, how much it costs, how it varies over time and thereby
enable them to act so as to achieve savings.
The Commission has acknowledged that ICT-based innovations may provide
one of the potentially most cost-effective means to help Member State achieve
the 2020 targets. A 2008 Commission communication identified the many ways
in which ICT can contribute to energy efficiency gains240. In 2009, the Commis-
sion launched an action plan to increase ICT usage to facilitate the transition to
an “energy efficient, low-carbon” technology.241 This was followed by a public
consultation which was to serve as a preparation ground for a Commission rec-
ommendation. The results were contained in a document which can be found on
the Commission web site.242 The Commission also supports activities to encour-
240. COM (2008) 241.
241. COM (2009) 111.
242. See the consultation’s results:
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age the development and application of ICT tools to improve energy efficiency
[framework program (FP7), ICT policy support program (ICT PSP)]. A lot of
projects focus on buildings and smart grids sectors243.
Later, the Commission adopted a set of recommendations244 intended to
increase the use of intelligent technologies in the fight against climate change.
These recommendations invite Member States notably to adopt through their
national regulatory authorities:
• by the end of 2010 at the latest, minimum functional specification for smart
metering that focuses on providing consumers with improves information
on, and improved capabilities to manage, their energy consumption;
• by the end of 2012 at the latest, set up a coherent timeframe for the roll-out
of smart metering.
They are also invited to engage all relevant stakeholders in large-scale pilots and
demonstrations of smart metering and smart grids, to build consensus on the
requirements for the emergence of future ICT-enabled innovations.
On the other side, the ICT sector can also contribute directly to the reduction of
its own GHG emissions. It was thus invited to commit to a progressive decar-
bonisation process leading to a measurable and verifiable reduction in energy
intensity and carbon emissions of all processes involved in the production, trans-
port, sales of ICT equipment and components.
In that framework, the Commission has developed some Voluntary Codes of
Conduct to improve the energy efficiency of data centres, digital TV services,
broadband equipment and external power supplies. There is thus, for example,
a voluntary Code of Conduct on Data Centres Energy Efficiency, adopted in
2008 and revised and complemented by a Best Practices Guide in 2010. To date
this code of conduct has been endorsed by 75 companies. There is also a Code
of Conduct on Energy Consumption of Broadband Equipment of 2008. The
energy consumption in the use-phase of ICT equipment is also covered of course
by the Directive 2005/32/EC establishing a framework for the setting of ecode-
sign requirements for energy-related products245. The Commission has finally
encouraged the launch of the ICT for Energy Efficiency Forum where the ICT
sector is working to establish a methodology to measure its own carbon emis-
sions and once this has been agreed to commit to reduction targets246.
243. See the Cordis website: http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/sustainable-growth/energy_en.html
244. Commission recommendation C(2009) 7604.
245. OJ 2005, L 191/29-58.
246. See http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sustainable_growth/ict4ee_forum/index_en.htm
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8.5. Much remains to be done about energy efficiency
All this reflects a rather slow development of the successive plans covering
energy efficiency. As the Commission itself acknowledged in the 2010 consulta-
tion document about a new energy strategy, “the energy savings potential con-
tinues to be greatly underutilised”247. The Commission has thus envisaged new
initiatives.
In the framework of the new Europe 2020 strategy, it has for example begun a
dialogue with Member States on how to determine national targets, which
would facilitate tighter monitoring of progress towards the EU common objec-
tive as well as more regular adjustment of national strategies. In parallel the
Commission has embarked on the preparation of a new framework for energy
efficiency policies which will both address bottlenecks to implement already
adopted measures and propose additional policies to fully exploit the energy
savings potential and achieve the 20% energy savings by 2020. “Preliminary
results of the ongoing evaluation of the Energy Efficiency Action Plan show that
there is yet progress to be made in areas such as energy supply and transforma-
tion and the role of utilities, transportation, establishment of a well functioning
market for energy services. Also in other areas additional instruments could be
needed to support the legislation (e.g. buildings)248.”
247. EC, Towards a new Energy Strategy for Europe 2011-2020, 2010, p.
248. Idem.83
9. Greenhouse Gases Emissions of Cars
9.1. The development of the policy
Road transport is currently the second biggest sources of greenhouse gas emis-
sions in Europe. It contributes about one fifth of the EU’s total emissions of
CO2, with passenger cars responsible for around 12%. It remains one of the few
sectors whose emissions keep rising, thereby acting as a brake to the global
progress made by other sectors.
The Commission first adopted a Community Strategy for reducing CO2 emis-
sions from cars in 1995249. The strategy was based on three pillars: (1) voluntary
commitments from the car industry to gradually improve the fuel efficiency of
new vehicles, (2) improvements in consumer information250 and (3) the promo-
tion of fuel efficient cars via fiscal measures. In 1998, the European Automobile
Manufacturers Association (ACEA) adopted a commitment to reduce average
emissions from new cars sold to 140 grams CO2/km by 2008 and, in 1999, the
Japanese and Korean Automobile Manufacturers Associations adopted a simi-
lar commitment to reduce average emissions from new cars sold to 140 grams
CO2/km by 2009.
This strategy has produced limited results so far. Although some improvements
in vehicle motor technology have led to a 12.4% fuel efficiency improvement
between 1995 and 2004, improvements have been offset by increased transport
and car size. In the period 1990-2004 CO2 emissions from road transport even
increased by 26%. The June 2006 European Council therefore unanimously
stated that “in line with the EU strategy on CO2 emissions from light duty vehi-
cles, the average new car fleet should achieve CO2 emissions of 140g/km (2008/
09) and 120g/km (2012).”251
In 2007, the European Commission issued a Communication252 in which it
reviewed its strategy. It acknowledged the limited results and came to the con-
clusion that a legislative framework would be necessary to achieve the 120
249. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – A community
strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and improve fuel economy, COM (95) 689.
250. See Directive 1999/94/EC which requires the display of a label on fuel consumption and CO2 emis-
sions on all new cars, the publication of national guides on the fuel efficiency of new cars, the display of
posters at the dealerships and the inclusion of fuel efficiency information in printed promotional litera-
ture.
251. Renewed EU Sustainable Development Strategy, Council of the European Union, 8 June2006, avail-
able from http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st10/st10117.en06.pdf
252. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Results of the
review of the Community Strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and light-commercial
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grams CO2/km /km target by 2012. The Commission’s view was subsequently
endorsed by the June 2007 Environment Council which “urged the European
Commission to come forward, as soon as possible and before the end of 2007,
with a legislative framework to reduce CO2 emissions from cars (…)”. The
Commission presented its proposal in 2007253.
Based on this revised strategy, a proposal for a Regulation to reduce the average
CO2 emissions of new passenger cars (which account for about 12% of the
European Union’s carbon emissions) was presented in 2007.254 This proposal
gave birth to Regulation 443/2009/EC.255 This proposed legislation is the cor-
nerstone of the EU’s strategy to improve fuel economy of cars and ensure that
average emissions from the new passenger car fleet in the Community do not
exceed 120g CO2/km through an integrated approach. This Regulation entered
into force and was directly applicable on the third day following its publication
in the Official Journal of the European Union. The measures implementing the
Regulation should be completed by the end of 2010, especially regarding the
procedure for approving innovative technologies (econ-innovations).
Regulation 443/2009/EC does not include light commercial vehicles due to the
necessity to gather more data on them. For that reason, on 28 October 2009,
and also as part of the revised strategy mentioned above, the European Commis-
sion adopted a new legislative proposal to reduce CO2 emissions from light
commercial vehicules (vans).256 Once adopted, this new Regulation should sup-
plement Regulation 443/2009/EC.
Since then, things are moving. The Competitiveness Council in its conclusions
on the “Need for a new industrial policy”257 of 2 March 2010 invited the Euro-
pean Commission to come forward with an action plan for clean and energy-
efficient vehicules (including the growing role of fully electric cars and plus-in
hybrids).
In 2010, the European Commission issued a Communication entitled “Euro-
pean strategy on clean and energy efficient vehicules” which builds on the ongo-
253. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting emission perform-
ance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community's integrated approach to reduce CO2
emissions from light-duty vehicles, COM/2007/856, 19 December 2007.
254. COM (2007) 856, accompanied by SEC (2007) 1723 and SEC (2007) 1724.
255. Regulation (EC) No 443/2009/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2009 set-
ting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community’s integrated
approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicules (OJ 2009, L 140/1).
256. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting emission perform-
ance standards for new light commercial vehicles as part of the Community’s integrated approach to
reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicules – COM (2009) 593.This proposal is accompanied by an
impact assessment – SEC (2009) 1454 and by the summary of the impact assessment – SEC (2009) 1455.
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ing measures and sets out an ambitious medium- to long-term policy through an
Action Plan. This Action Plan highlights the necessity of further reduction of
CO2 emissions from conventional vehicules. In addition, the scope of the Com-
mission’s communication covers not only light-duty vehicule but also two- and
three-wheelers and quadricycles, taking into account the increasing role of the
latter in the urban mobility and acknowledges the need to cover heavy-duty
vehicules and progress quickly also in other fields of transport.
This 2010 communication was welcome by the Competitiveness Council held
on 25 May 2010 which shared the Commission’s analysis that while conven-
tional vehicules powered by the internal combustion engines will remain domi-
nant until at least 2020, electric and hydrogen vehicules are highly promising
ultra-low carbon power-train technology. It also emphasized that, in the light of
scientific and market evidence, electric vehicules (including pure electric and
plug-in hybrids) are now ready for mass production by some manufacturers and
for broad consumer acceptance, whereas hydrogen vehicules need further tech-
nological development and remain a valid ultra-low carbon mobility option in
the longer-term perspective. It also notes that rechargeable electric vehicules
could be a bridge to hydrogen fuel cell vehicules and urged European standard-
ization bodies to develop, as a matter of priority by mid-2011, a harmonized
solution for the interoperability between electric vehicules and the charging
infrastructure and to address safety risks and electromagnetic compatibility.
Finally, it also encourages public authorities to provide for appropriate support
framework, in compliance with state aid rules in order to speed up the uptake
of clean and energy efficient vehicules
9.2. Regulation 443/2009/EC for passenger cars
Regulation 443/2009/EC aims to strike a careful balance between the interests
of the European car industry and the need to reduce GHG emissions in the road
transport sector.
9.2.1. Scope of application
Regulation 443/2009/EC covers passenger cars which are registered in the Com-
munity for the first time and which have not previously been registered outside
the Community.258. Special purpose vehicles such as wheel-chair accessible vehi-
cles are excluded from the scope of application. Small volume independent man-
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ufacturers may under certain conditions benefit from a derogation.259.
9.2.2. The 120 g/km target
Regulation 443/2009/EC sets a binding target for new cars of 120 g/km by
2012260 To meet that target, the present Regulation delivers an integrated
approach focusing on mandatory reductions to reach an objective of 130 g CO2/
km on average for the new fleet through improvements in vehicle motor tech-
nology, and further reduction of 10 g CO2/km or equivalent, by other comple-
mentary measures (for instance, the increased use of biofuels or efficiency
improvements for car components with impact on fuel consumption such as
tyres and air conditioning systems).
Regulation 443/2009/EC defines a limit value curve of CO2 emissions allowed
for new vehicules according to the mass of the vehicle. The curve is set in such
a way that the fleet average to be achieved by all cars registered in the EU is 130
g/km. A so-called limit value curve implies thus that heavier cars are allowed
higher emissions than lighter, provided the overall fleet average is preserved. In
other words, this means that manufacturers may make cars with emissions
above the limit value curve provided these are balanced by cars which are below
the curve as long as the fleet average remains at 130 g/km.
In 2012, 65% of each manufacturer’s newly registered cars must comply on
average with the limit value curve set by Regulation 443/2009/EC. This will rise
to 75% in 2013, 80% in 2014, and 100% from 2015 onwards.261
Regulation 443/2009/EC also provides manufacturers with the necessary incen-
tive to reduce the CO2 emissions of their vehicules by imposing an excess emis-
sions premium.262 More concretely, until 2018, if the average CO2 emissions of
a manufacturer’s fleet exceed its limit value in any year from 2012, the manu-
facturer has to pay an excess emissions premium for each car registered. This
premium amounts to €5 for the first g/km of exceedance, €15 for the second g/
km, €25 for the third g/km, and €95 for each subsequent g/km. From 2019,
already the first g/km of exceedance will cost €95.
Super-credits will be given for passenger cars with specific emissions of less than
50 g C02/km.263 Until 2015, a 5% reduction will also be granted to vehicles
259. Art. 11 of Regulation 443/2009/EC.
260. Art. 1 of Regulation 443/2009/EC.
261. Art. 4 of Regulation 443/2009/EC.
262. Art. 9 of Regulation 443/2009/EC.
263. Art. 5 of Regulation 443/2009/EC.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
87
designed to be capable of running on a mixture of petrol with 85% ethanol
(‘E85’) which meets relevant Community legislation or European technical
standards.264
9.2.3. Long-term target
Regulation 443/2009/EC indicates that a target of 95 g/km will be specified for
the year 2020. The modalities for reaching this target and the aspects of its
implementation including the excess emissions premium will have to be defined
in a review to be completed non later than the beginning of 2013265.
9.2.4. Eco-innovation
Manufacturers can be granted a maximum of 7 g/km of emission credits on
average for their fleet if they equip vehicules with innovative technologies, based
on independently verified data.266 The European Commission must adopt by
2010 detailed provisions for a procedure to approve such innovative technolo-
gies.
9.2.5. Pooling
Manufacturers, other than those which have obtained a derogation according
to article 11 of Regulation 443/2009/EC, have the opportunity to form a pool
for the purposes of meeting their obligations267. In such a pool, manufacturing
groups can team up in order to share the burden. The pool must respect open,
transparent and non-discriminatory conditions. Where manufacturers form a
pool, they are deemed to have met their targets under this Regulation provided
that the average emissions of the pool as a whole do not exceed the target emis-
sions for the pool.
9.2.6. Monitoring and reporting
Each Member State shall record information for each new passenger car regis-
tered in its territory and transfer this information to the Commission.268 The
data which must be collected are detailed in Annex II. The Commission will
264. Art. 6 of Regulation 443/2009/EC.
265. Art. 1, al. 2 of Regulation 443/2009/EC.
266. Art. 12 of Regulation 443/2009/EC.
267. Art. 7 of Regulation 443/2009/EC.
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keep a central register of the data reported by Member States and will calculate
provisionally each year for each manufacturer the average specific emissions of
CO2. The provisional calculation will be communicated to each manufacturer.
After a period of a few months, the Commission will either confirm or amend
its calculation. It will then notify the manufacturers which have exceeded their
emissions target.
By 31 October of each year, commencing in 2011, the Commission will publish
a list indicating a series of information about each manufacturer.269
9.3. The legislative proposal for light commercial 
vehicules
This draft regulation is closely modelled on Directive 443/2009/EC. So it will be
described more briefly. The debate is going on in the Council and the Parlia-
ment’s position should be adopted before the end of 2010.
9.3.1. Scope of application
The draft Regulation270 covers light commercial vehicules (LCVs – vans). The
vehicles affected by the draft Regulation are vans, which account for around
12% of the market for light-duty vehicules. This includes vehicles used to carry
goods weighing up to 3.5t (vans and car-derived vans, known as N1) and which
weigh less than 2610 kg when empty.
9.3.2. The 175 g/km target
The draft Regulation sets a binding target for LCVs of 175 g/km by 2016, to be
applied as of 2014.
Emissions limits are set according to the mass of vehicule, using a limit value
curve. The curve is set in such a way that a fleet average of 175 g/km is achieved.
A so-called limit value curve of 100% implies that heavier vans are allowed
higher emissions than lighter vans while preserving the overall fleet average.
Only the fleet average is regulated, so manufacturers will still be able to make
269. Art. 10 of Regulation 443/2009/EC.
270. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting emission perform-
ance standards for new light commercial vehicles as part of the Community’s integrated approach to
reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicules – COM (2009) 593.This proposal is accompanied by an
impact assessment – SEC (2009) 1454 and by the summary of the impact assessment – SEC (2009) 1455.THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
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vehicules with emissions above the limit value curve provided these are balanced
by other vehicules which are below the curve.
From 2014, a manufacturer must ensure that those vehicules registered in the
EU for which it is responsible have average emissions that are below its target
when 75% of the vehicules are taken into account. For the calendar year 2015,
the percentage rises to 80% and from 2016 onwards to 100% of the manufac-
turer’s fleet.
The draft Regulation also provides manufacturers with the necessary incentive
to reduce the CO2 emissions of their vehicules by imposing an excess emissions
premium. More concretely, until 2018, if the average CO2 emissions of a man-
ufacturer’s fleet exceed its limit value in any year from 2014, the manufacturer
has to pay an excess emissions premium for each car registered. This premium
amounts to €5 for the first g/km of exceedance, €15 for the second g/km, €25
for the third g/km, and €120 for each subsequent CO2 g/km. From 2019,
already the first g/km of excess will cost €120. This value is higher than the one
for passenger cars (€95) because of the differences in compliance costs.
9.3.3. The long-term target
A target of 135 g/km is specified for the year 2020. Confirmation of the target
with the updated impact assessment, the modalities for reaching this target, and
the aspects of its implementation, including the excess emissions premium, will
have to be defined in a review to be completed not later than the beginning of
2013.
9.3.4. Super credits
Vehicles with specific emissions of less than 50 g /km will be given additional
incentives whereby 1 low-emitting van will be counted as 2.5 vehicles in 2014,
as 1.5 vehicles in 2015, and 1 vehicle from 2016.
9.3.5. Eco-innovations
Manufacturers can be granted a maximum of 7 g/km of emission credits on
average for their fleet if they equip vehicules with innovative technologies, based
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9.3.6. Pooling
Manufacturers may group together to form a pool and act jointly in meeting the
specific emissions targets. Independent manufacturers who sell fewer than
22,000 vehicules per year can also apply to the Commission for an individual
target instead.91
10. Greenhouse Gases Emissions of Fuels
Directive 2009/30/EC271 amends Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of
petrol and diesel fuels272. It has two main objectives. Firstly, after many debates
about the sustainability of first generation biofuels, it aims at defining sustaina-
bility criteria for biofuels used to meet greenhouse gas reduction requirement.
Secondly, it aims at reducing the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions by up to
10% per unit of energy from fuel and energy supplied, and at least by 6%. It
also tightens the environmental quality standards for a number of fuel parame-
ters.
10.1. Biofuels sustainability
Firstly, the text aims at defining the same sustainability criteria for the use of
biofuels for the purposes of this Directive on the one hand and Directive 2009/
28/EC on the other. Otherwise, contradictions could create many problems.
Directive 2009/30/EC distinguishes biofuels in general from biofuels produced
from waste and residues.273. Biofuels produced from waste and residues are sub-
mitted to a reduced number of conditions. Both categories must represent a
reduction of GHG emissions of at least 35%.
Some sustainability criteria aim at ensuring that biofuels qualify for incentives
only when it can be guaranteed that they do not originate in biodiverse areas or,
in the case of areas designated for nature protection purposes or for the protec-
tion or rare, threatened or endangered ecosystems or species, the relevant com-
petent authority demonstrates that the production of the raw material does not
interfere with those purposes. Specific rules have been foreseen to calculate the
impact of greenhouse gas emissions in case of land conversion.
Some problems can arise concerning biofuels imported from third countries.
Directive 2009/30/EC introduced moderate instruments concerning this ques-
tion. It encourage the development of multilateral and bilateral agreements and
voluntary international or national schemes that cover key environmental and
social considerations, in order to promote the production of biofuels worldwide
in a sustainable manner (and even social norms). In the absence of such agree-
271. OJ 2009, L 140/88.
272. OJ 1998, L 350.
273. New art. 7b of Directive 98/70THE EU CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CLIMATE PACKAGE AND COPENHAGEN – PROMISES AND LIMITS
92
ments or schemes, Member States must require economic operators to report on
those issues.
10.2. The reduction of the life cycle greenhouse gas 
emissions from fuel
The reduction of GHG emissions from fuel is meant to complete the reduction
of these emissions from cars. In a very complex formula, “suppliers should, by
31 December 2020, gradually reduce life cycle greenhouse gas emissions by up
to 10% per unit of energy from fuel and energy supplied. This reduction should
amount to at least 6% by 31 December 2020, compared to the EU-average level
of life cycle greenhouse gas emissions per unit of energy from fossil fuels in
2010, obtained through the use of biofuels, alternative fuels and reductions in
flaring and venting at production sites. Subject to a review, it should comprise a
further 2% reduction obtained through the use of environmentally friendly car-
bon capture and storage technologies and electric vehicles and an additional
further 2% reduction obtained through the purchase of credits under the Clean
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol” (recital 9).93
11. The Set-Plan
In 2007, after the call of existing European technology platforms for joint action
at EU level and after a public consultation with all stakeholders274, the Commis-
sion decided then to adopt a first SET-Plan275 endorsed by the spring European
Council held on 13-14 March 2008. The SET-plan is the technology pillar of the
EU climate and energy package. It attempts to put technology development at
the core of climate change mitigation policies. This first SET-Plan is considered
as the start of a dynamic process that will be regularly reviewed and adjusted to
changing needs and priorities.
11.1. The SET-Plan objectives
The strategic objective of the SET-Plan is ambitious. On the one hand, it aims at
accelerating the development of low carbon technologies in order to avoid that
the EU imports such technologies to achieve its own climate change objectives
by 2020 and by 2050. On the other hand, it aims also to allow the EU to become
a global leader in the development and market take up of these technologies in
order to grasp the opportunities of these new markets worldwide. This must be
done by putting in place a process to rationalize and render more effective cur-
rent efforts by the EU, Member States, Industry, Research and Financing com-
munities.
11.2. The Strategy
11.2.1. A new joint strategic planning
The joint strategic planning must orient the research and innovation efforts
towards technologies and measures with the greatest potential to deliver the
European energy policy targets. In that perspective, two things were realized.
(1) A European Community Steering Group on Strategic Energy Technologies
274. See the Commission’s report on the public consultation on the European Strategic Energy Technol-
ogy Plan (SET-Plan) dated 01.09.2007.
275. See Commission’s communication “A European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan)
[COM(2007) 723]. This communication was accompanied by several Commission’s staff working docu-
ments: SEC(2007) 1508 gives a full impact assessment while SEC(2007) 1509 gives the summary of the
full impact assessment; SEC(2007) 1510 offers a description of the current status and prospects of key
energy technologies for the identification of potential European initiatives that could be considered as
part of the SET-Plan. SEC(2007) 1511 contains an analysis of Energy Research capacities in EU Member
States.
It is another Commission’s communication entitled “Towards a European Strategic Energy Technology
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has been created. This Steering Group, chaired by the European Commission, is
made up of high level government representatives with expertise in energy and
research from all 27 EU Member States. It is responsible for coordinating poli-
cies and programs, promoting joint activities and identifying resources to ensure
implementation of the SET-plan initiatives. It is also tasked with reviewing the
SET-plan’s progress and ensuring its goals are achieved. It is assisted by a Secre-
tariat and its work is supported by regularly up-dated information provided by
a web-portal called SETIS276 (European Energy Technology Information Sys-
tem), both provided by the Commission. (2) The Commission organized a Euro-
pean Energy Technology Summit.
Furthermore, the transition to a sustainable interconnected, low-carbon energy
system will take decades and affect many sectors, including environment, trans-
port and trade. A clear view is needed on how it will be done. The Plan foresees
that the European Commission will develop its ideas in this area. It is assisted
by the European Strategy for Research Infrastructures (ESFRI). ESFRI was cre-
ated in 2002 as a forum composed of representatives of all EU Member States
and associated countries plus one representative of the European Commission.
It aims to support coherent and strategy-led approach to policy-making on
research infrastructures in Europe, and to facilitate multilateral initiatives lead-
ing to the better use and development of research infrastructures, at EU and
international level.
11.2.2. A more effective management
All activities must be covered by a more effective implementation, execution and
management regime of all activities across the whole innovation process. In that
perspective, six priority European Industrial initiatives (EIIs)277 have been
selected on the basis of various criteria278. They are in the areas of wind; solar
(PV and CSP); bio-energy; CO2 capture, transport and storage; electricity grid;
sustainable nuclear fission (gen-IV).279 The EIIs could take the form of “public
(Member State) – public (EC) – private partnerships. The implementation of
those EIIs will be in cascade (not all at once). A preparation process is ongoing.
276. SETIS website is the following: http://setis.ec.europa.eu/.
277. To be more precise, the European Industrial Initiatives are technology programmes to achieve quan-
tified technology objectives agreed between private and public (EC and Member States) partners.
Through the roadmaps (presented by the European Commission), they establish the technology, develop-
ments actions for a 10 year (2010-2020) period for the sectors to reach those objectives. With a limited
number of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for each EII, progress in the implementation of these
actions will be reviewed and monitored in a simple, open and transparent manner.
278. The criteria applied are the following: the EU added value and additionality; the willingness of
actors to join forces; the potential market penetration of the technology in different time horizons; the
potential contribution to CO2 reduction, security of supply and competitiveness.
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On 3-4 June 2010, a high level summit conference will take place in Madrid.
The main focus of the conference will be the formal launching of the EIIs that
demonstrate their maturity and their cost-effectiveness, as well as the presenta-
tion of their main aspects, including scope of activities for 2010-2012, budgets,
funding instruments, management and governance structures.
11.2.3. The European Energy Research Alliance
A European Energy Research Alliance (EERA) has also been created by ten
leading European Research Institutes280, after the signing of a Declaration of
Intent in 2008. Its objective is to enable greater cooperation across Europe of
the research work going on in universities, research institutes and specialized
centres through the conception and implementation of joint research pro-
grammes aligned with the SET-Plan priorities to the point where they can be
embedded in industry driven research. EERA’s membership will in principle be
open to all research organizations that can contribute to achieving its objectives.
New Member States are in particular invited to join. The European Energy
Research Alliance (EERA) is now ready to launch its first research activities
11.2.4. A better allocation of means
A cost-effective and results-oriented allocation and increase of means (financial
and human). In that perspective, the Commission issued in 2009 a communica-
tion on financing low carbon technologies in the framework of the SET-Plan.281
This communication identifies notably the key technologies and activities where
investments are needed in the 10 coming years. Indications on how much money
is needed and on how the money should be divided are also presented. The bulk
of the funds required will have to come mainly from the private sector and from
Member States, but it is not clear how the financial burden should be shared
between the two. Currently, energy research funding is about 70% private and
30% public, excluding nuclear research. A contribution from the EU budget and
the BEI is also foreseen. The European Energy Research Alliance could also
bring, with the expansion of its activities, an additional public investment. In a
separate working document, the European Commission has also drawn up tech-
nology roadmaps 2010-2010282, accompanied by cost estimates. The technol-
280. They are: CEA (France), CIEMAT (Spain), CRES (Greece), ECN (The Netherlands), ENEA (Italy),
JÜLICH (Germany), INETI (Portugal), RISO DTU (Denmark), UKERC (United-Kingdom), VTT (Fin-
land) . These research institutes encompass an annual R&D budget on energy research of more than
1,300 M€.
281. COM(2009) 519/4, accompanied by the following working documents: SEC (2009) 1295; SEC
(2009) 1296; SEC (2009) 1297.
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ogy roadmaps represent a stable planning framework, enabling industry, the EC
and Member States to identify and develop joint actions.
To come back to the financing question, with today’s level of knowledge, the
Commission believes that investment in the EU has to increase from the current
€3 bn per year to around €8 bn per year to effectively move forward the SET-
Plan. This would represent an additional investment, public and private, of €50
bn over the next 10 years.
11.2.5. A improved international cooperation
International cooperation will be approached differently depending on whether
the third countries are developed countries or developing countries. With devel-
oped countries where competition is a key element, more cooperation on “pub-
lic good” research (for instance safety and public acceptance) as well as on
longer-term frontier research is needed. With developing and emerging econo-
mies, the Community interest lies more in helping them develop and grow in a
more sustainable manner while building new markets for EU industry. This
includes networking technology centres, large-scale demonstration projects on
technologies, innovative financing mechanisms, the use of the Kyoto mecha-
nisms.
The Steering Group, the EIIs and the EERA should also bring about a reinforced
international cooperation strategy, as well as the EU speaking with a single voice
in international fora. Cooperation here with the US is on very good track, as
well as Japan. The Commission has also begun discussions with India, Canada,
Russia, Brazil, China (not progressing very much).97
12. Adaptation: A Substitute for Mitigation?
In 2007, the Commission presented a Green Paper on Adapting to Climate
Change in Europe283. This opened a wide process of consultation. Research
efforts also identified action to be taken in the short-term. A white paper has
thus been presented in 2009284. It has been accompanied by three sectoral
papers on agriculture285, health286 and water, coasts and marine issues287. These
seem to be considered as the three priority areas of adaptation.
According to the EEA, the most vulnerable areas in Europe are Southern
Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, Outermost regions and Arctic region. Fur-
thermore, mountain areas, in particular the Alps, islands, coastal and urban
areas and densely populated floodplains are facing particular problems. In
Northern and Western Europe a more complex balance between negative and
positive effects is projected for moderate levels of climate change288.
The Commission examined a wide range of options. At an early stage, some of
them were abandoned. They encompassed substantial changes in EU financing
schemes. Such schemes, according to the Commission, could not be foreseen
under the current multi-annual financial framework, and could not pre-empt
any post 2013 multi-annual financial framework. Consequently, three main
options for short-term action at EU level were defined. Option A (Baseline) con-
strained the development of adaptation strategies to the national level. Option
B (process towards an EU adaptation policy) opened a phase of definition of a
EU adaptation policy. Option C (EU Adaptation Action Plan) gave priority to
new legislative initiatives to promote sustainable adaptation actions. Finally,
option B was preferred.
The white paper thus encompasses two phases. During the first one, from 2010
to 2012, the EU will define the framework of its strategy. From 2013, this strat-
egy should then be implemented. During the first phase, a solid knowledge base
on the impact of climate change for the EU shall be built. Adaptation will be
taken into consideration in different key policy areas. Various policy instru-
ments (market-based instruments, guidelines, public-private partnerships) will
283. COM (2007) 354.
284. COM (2009) 147; SEC (2009) 387.
285. SEC (2009) 1093.
286. SEC (2009) 416.
287. SEC (2009) 386.
288. EEA, Impacts of Europe's changing climate — 2008 indicator-based assessment, 2008, esp. pp. 31-
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be used. International cooperation shall be developed. This strategy was glo-
bally adopted by the Council289.
289. Bulletin EU 6-2009, § 1.23.3.99
13. International Aspects: The EU and the 
Post-Kyoto Regime
13.1. The preparation of the Copenhagen conference
The EU played a fundamental role in the adoption of the United Nations Cli-
mate Change Convention in 1992. This role remained fundamental during the
negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. The ETS was meant from the beginning to be
connected to other cap and trade systems in the framework of the Kyoto Proto-
col. The EU thus gave a high importance to the negotiation of a new interna-
tional climate convention, to replace the Kyoto protocol after 2012.
At the beginning of 2009, the Commission proposed a strategy for the Copen-
hagen Conference290. It relied on agreeing with other developed countries on a
set of GHG reduction targets, ensuring comparable efforts, in order to collec-
tively deliver 30% emission reductions in 2020 compared to 1990. Developing
countries had to commit to deliver collectively a deviation of 15-30% below
business as usual in 2020. Significant financial commitments for emission reduc-
tions and adaptation had to be taken, especially towards the most vulnerable
and poorest developing countries. Finally, bilateral partnerships with other
developed countries had to be explored to share experience on designing domes-
tic emissions trading systems and to facilitate the creation of a robust OECD-
wide carbon market by 2015.
A second communication was presented later on the financial aspects of the
negotiation291. It proposed to increase the international finance to help develop-
ing countries combat climate change. According to the Commission, the scale of
finance required for mitigating emissions and adapting to climate change in
developing countries had to reach roughly € 100 billion additional investments
per year by 2020. These € 100 billion had to come from three different sources:
domestic finance (public and private) in developing countries, the international
carbon market and international public finance. As much as € 38 billion could
be expected from the international carbon market, if designed properly. In that
context, it was indispensable to establish a new sectoral crediting mechanism,
while focussing the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) on least developed
countries. International public finance was estimated in the range of € 22 to 50
billion per year (which is quite wide). This required the contribution not only
from industrialised countries but also from economically more advanced devel-
290. COM (2009) 39.
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oping countries. On this basis, the EU contribution to international public
finance was estimated from around 10% to around 30% (which is also very
wide).
13.2. The Copenhagen Accord
The Copenhagen accord in fact defines a very general outline. It is a very loose
framework for further negotiations. Firstly, it defines a goal for limiting the glo-
bal temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius. It thus establishes a process for
countries to enter specific mitigation pledges by January 31, 2010. In a joint
letter dated 28 January 2010, the EU and its Member States formally notified to
the UN that the EU will reduce its GHG emissions by 20% compared to 1990
levels. In this letter, the EU also reiterated its offer to increase this cut to 30%
provided that other major emitters agree to take on their fair share of a global
reduction effort.
The Copenhagen accord also anticipates in broad terms a system for the report-
ing and verification of States’ action. Developed countries commit themselves to
contribute 30 billion dollars in new and additional resources during the period
2010-2012 to assist developing countries in the reduction of emissions, the pres-
ervation of forests and the adaptation to climate change. Finally, they commit
themselves to transferring 100 billion dollars per year by 2020 to the developing
countries.
Different instruments are foreseen in that perspective. A Copenhagen Green Cli-
mate Fund will have to manage the new financial resources. A high level panel
will examine the possible ways of reaching the 2020 financial goal. A new tech-
nology mechanism will define rules about transfers. Finally, a specific mecha-
nism will channel the funds for reduced deforestation.
Seen in the short term context of the conference, such an accord may easily be
perceived as a success. Before Copenhagen, there was no commitment of China
and the USA, which are the two main GHG emitters. There was no general
commitment of the developed countries to provide finance for mitigation and
adaptation in the developing countries. There was more or less nothing concern-
ing the fight against deforestation. Now, such things exist. It makes little sense
to present them as insignificant. On the other side, seen in a long term perspec-
tive, made of long trail of negotiations from 1988, many years of discussion
concerning the succession of the Kyoto protocol, and the accelerated degrada-
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approved outline still requires very long, detailed, and difficult negotiations, and
the 2012 deadline is now closer.
It is thus possible to present the accord as both a tactical success and a strategic
failure (which is the stuff that led to many lost wars). The outcome is clearly
more than nothing, but insufficient considering the time-scale of the problem.
Even if Copenhagen represents a progress, honesty requires to acknowledge that
climate warming progresses much quicker than the international cooperation
against it.
This is clearly confirmed by the Commission’ s analysis of the impact of the
Copenhagen Accord, presented in May 2010. “The Copenhagen Accord does
not yet give certainty that these reduced emission levels will be actually accom-
plished. Most high end targets are conditional on others taking similar action,
on a legally binding international agreement or on the need for further interna-
tional financial or technical support making their degree of implementation
uncertain. Furthermore possible double counting of targets and pledges through
the carbon market and the issues related to surplus Assigned Amount Units and
LULUCF accounting could further weaken the ambition level. Adding all these
uncertainties up would result in a much bleaker picture with emissions almost
back to business as usual”292.
13.3. The causes of an insufficient result
It is really important to distinguish the causes of this unsatisfactory outcome, if
one wants to improve it. Otherwise, one runs the risks of concentrating exclu-
sively on one aspect without increasing much the probability of a success.
13.3.1. The process
A lot of people have incriminated the weakness of the presidency of the confer-
ence, and also the cumbersome rule of the UN regarding the negotiation and the
approval of an agreement. A Danish compromise was seen as biased to many
developing countries. The formal approval of the agreement was blocked by 5
States among 192. Finally, the separation of two tracks in the negotiation
(Kyoto and UNFCCC) obviously complicated it.
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Various comments emphasize that it is impossible to negotiate in depth about
such complex and numerous topics without restricting the format of the negoti-
ation. As a matter of fact, it seems that the situation could be improved. A first
writing board could be composed of the main polluters and financers. The rules
concerning the signature and the entry into force of the treaties could be made
a little bit softer. The strict Kyoto framework could also be made more open to
allow various forms of commitments from the parties. On the other side, it is
difficult to condemn fully the UN framework, as it gives at least a voice to the
countries which are the most threatened by climate warming. The advantage of
the UN is precisely that its legitimacy is the most difficult to contest. The chal-
lenge is to make it a little bit more efficient.
13.3.2. The structure
The process cannot be separated from the institutional framework of the nego-
tiation. The Copenhagen conference suffered also from the absence of an inter-
national organization especially dedicated to the climate, or at least to the envi-
ronment (with a section covering climate).
The negotiations have become extremely complex. They require a lot of techni-
cal background. They cover a lot of various topics (cap and trade systems, finan-
cial transfers, intellectual property transfers, research, control of emissions,…).
Some of them are related to the activities of different international organiza-
tions, and thus require coordination. All of this can of course be brought to the
negotiation table, but it is much more difficult to do it without a solid adminis-
trative structure.
13.3.3. The heart of the matter: how to define a world efficient 
and fair system in a completely new area?
However, these defects must not hide the essence of the difficulty. Even with a
better process and a better institutional setting, it is not evident that the result
would have been fundamentally different. In the present context of aggravation
of climate change, the world’s States have to commit themselves to important
changes. They also need to find an agreement about the repartition of the
efforts. They need a system which is both efficient and fair. This is a very difficult
target to reach.
As far as efficiency is concerned, the “cap and trade” regime established by the
Kyoto system has not proven its full usefulness yet. At the regional level, the EU
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cate that a “cap and trade” system must at least be completed by a mechanism
that can guarantee a minimum of stability for the carbon price. A carbon tax has
been described as the best supporting mechanism293. At the international level,
the clean development mechanism (CDM) has provoked many negative
reports294. It should at least be thoroughly revised. Furthermore, the surveil-
lance of the States’ policies has not appeared satisfactory until now, and should
therefore be strengthened.
In synthesis, whatever has been launched by the Kyoto protocol, there have
been, even in the most ambitious States, few real constraints concerning the
reduction of GHG emissions. As a very logical result, these emissions have not
diminished very much. And their growth in the world has in fact accelerated. In
an insufficiently commented forecast at the end of 2009, the IEA has announced
that the world was now on a track for a rise of 6° Celsius in 2100 (which is quite
far from the 2° C sponsored in the Copenhagen Accord.
This evolution has made more necessary a quick reduction of GHG emissions.
It has been estimated that they should now reach a ceiling in 2020 in the devel-
oped countries. Needless to say, such measures will impose much higher con-
straints in the energy consumption. It is thus inevitable that their adoption will
provoke huge resistances.
The difficulty of the debate about efficiency is compounded by the equity ques-
tion. Countries, like people, are not eager to commit themselves to a policy they
see as unfair. Developing countries emphasize the difference between themselves
and the developed countries in the GHG emissions per capita. They understand-
ably ask for some equalization before they begin to restrain their own emissions.
Some of them even ask for a compensation covering the two last centuries of
GHG emissions. Finally, they consider that they require technology transfers
which should be financed by the developed countries.
To reach some kind of consensus about equity in any international debate gath-
ering developed and developing countries is never easy. It is thus not surprising
that the climate debate is particularly difficult, since it raises new, complex and
essential questions. Moreover, climate, as we have seen, is the utmost of the
collective good. Climate change has rightly been described by the Stern report
as “the greatest market failure”. This is an essential qualification, because it
293. See HELM, EU climate change policy – A critique, in D. HELM and C. HEPBURN eds., The Eco-
nomics and Politics of Climate Change, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.
294. See M. WARA and D. VICTOR, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets, Stanford PESD,
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means that the solution requires not only interdictions (which is largely the stuff
of WTO and partially of banking negotiations), but positive measures.
Moreover, these positive measures must cover a broad specter of domains,
which are complex and depend from other international organizations. For
example, it is not enough to adopt a target for financial transfers to the devel-
oping countries: the funds (hopefully additional) must be efficiently adminis-
tered. Technology transfers depend on WIPO rules. Possibly new rules must be
defined. Trade measures, taxes, technological standards measures depend on
WTO rules, etc…
Last and most fundamentally, even without any international aspect, even
between equally developed countries, at the end, climate change is always about
the rationalization of energy consumption (less energy and/or better energy). In
the short term, this is always costly, and thus rather unpopular. The improve-
ment of energy technologies requires a lot of investments and time. They offer
perspectives only in the long term. In the short term, there is thus no easy solu-
tion. On the other side, in the long term, it can be said that the more we wait,
the more expensive and dolorous a transition towards a low carbon future will
become. This remains the most fundamental impediment to any progress.
13.3.4. The next steps
In April 2010, the Commission has proposed a revised strategy295. Taking into
consideration the probability that there would be no new treaty adopted in
2010, it proposes a step by step approach. First, it announces an analysis of
what practical policies would be required to implement the 30% emission
reduction, and a pathway for the EU transition to becoming a low-carbon econ-
omy by 2050. Second, it underlines the need to develop the international carbon
market, considered as essential for driving low-carbon investments and reducing
global emissions cost-effectively. The Commission acknowledges, however, the
pending problem of the Kyoto Protocol. The limited number of committed
countries and other serious weaknesses (accounting rules for forestry emissions
and handling of surplus national emission rights from the 2008-2012 period)
must be addressed296. Third, it proposes that the EU implements swiftly its com-
mitment to provide €2.4 billion in ‘fast start’ financial assistance to developing
countries annually in 2010-2012.
295. COM (2010) 86.
296. See the interesting synthesis of Commission staff working document: COM (2010) 86, §§ 1.1.9 and
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Conclusions
An evaluation of the impact of any new EU policy is naturally very difficult. This
is especially true in the field of climate warming, for different reasons. Firstly,
climate is by definition difficult to anticipate. This is one of the fundamentals of
the topic. Secondly, there are numerous intricacies with other topics, beginning
with energy (but also transport, agriculture, architecture… and other aspects of
the environmental policy of course). The effects of the EU measures also depend
on the evolution of economic growth (the financial crisis was a blessing for the
reduction of GHG emissions).
More fundamentally, climate warming is by essence a global threat, which can
only find a solution with a global action. The EU could reduce by 80% its GHG
emissions in 2030 and have no impact whatsoever on the growth of world tem-
perature if this reduction is compensated by additional rises in other zones of
the world. All this said, in a long term perspective, some general comments can
be made.
1. What has the EU achieved until now?
In 1997, the EU accepted important commitments in the framework of the
Kyoto protocol. Since then, it has reached substantial results. As the EEA related
in 2009, “GHG emissions in the European Union are decreasing and are
expected to continue to do so with the implementation of all measures planned
by Member States. In 2008, for the fourth consecutive year, emissions in the EU
decreased to reach their lowest level since 1990. The EU-27 has been achieving
significant decoupling of its emissions from economic growth. Greenhouse gas
emissions in the EU-27 now represent 11 to 12% of global greenhouse gas emis-
sions and each EU citizen emits on average 10.2 t CO2-equivalent every
year”297. The GHG of the European economy has also diminished strongly since
1990. Between 1990 and 2005, GHG emissions in the EU-15 have been reduced
by 7.6% GHG emissions, although GDP increased by 44% 298.
In spite of these positive elements, some facts indicate that the EU effort has
remained limited until now. Firstly, the EU benefited from the easy targets attrib-
uted at the time to Central and Eastern Countries (as a matter of time they began
their economic transition just in 1990). Secondly, the EU has also used the flex-
297. EEA, Greenhouse gas emission trends and projections in Europe 2009 – Tracking progress towards
Kyoto targets, EEA Reports 9/2009, p. 8.
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ibility mechanisms established by the Kyoto protocol. However, the efficiency of
these mechanisms has become increasingly criticized299. Thirdly, the price of
carbon has remained very low and no rise perspective appears in the foreseeable
future. Fourthly, and lastly, the heaviest positive factor in the EU achievement is
now the 2009 economic recession, which has brought quite a reduction of GHG
emissions.
Furthermore, the next years will not be easy. In fact, between MS projections for
2020 and the EU’s 2020 targets (–20% and –30% respectively), a quite signifi-
cant gap appears. The EU will thus have to follow a much steeper emission
reduction path after 2012 as compared to the period 1990-2012. Depending on
the actual target, in 2020 emission reductions will have to amount to 1,000-
1,500 Mt CO2 equivalents compared to baseline scenario300.
2. What will be the costs?
The costs will undoubtedly be substantial. In synthesis, energy is the first pillar
of our economy, so reorganising it in depth represents inevitably a huge endeav-
our. Furthermore, the development of new technological solutions (for renewa-
ble energy, carbon sequestration or treatment of nuclear waste) will require
much money301. Energy infrastructures cost a lot, and require also a long pay-
back. However, the long term costs could be limited. The Commission’s evalua-
tions in the impact assessment of the climate package limit this around 0,58-
0,45% GNP, depending on the availability of CDM302. Considering the serious-
ness of the threat, this should be considered as a bargain. It must be however
repeated that such positive evaluations have been criticized with good argu-
ments. One must also take into consideration the social consequences that could
be provoked by a steep rise of energy prices.
299. Ten MS of the EU-15 as well as Hungary and Slovenia have decided to use the Kyoto mechanisms to
reach their Kyoto targets. Together, these EU-15 MS would acquire 93.1 Mt CO2-eq. per year for compli-
ance under the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. This represents approximately 2.2 per-
centage points towards the EU-15 Kyoto target of –8% (see Table 12 in the SWD). These 10 MS together
have decided to invest almost € 3 billion to acquire units through JI, CDM or emissions trading. Austria,
the Netherlands, Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal allocated the largest budgets (€ 531 million, € 506
million, € 409 million, € 330 million and € 305 million, respectively, for the five-year commitment
period). In Slovenia, the budget has been estimated for € 80 million. Hungary plans to participate in
international emission trading. (COM [2009] 630, p. 15).
About these mechanisms' problems, see the staff working document accompanying the 2009 communica-
tion on the preparation of the Copenhagen Conference: SEC (2009) 32, pp. 87-89 and especially L. Sch-
neider, Is the CDM fulfilling its environmental and sustainable development objectives? An Evaluation of
the CDM and options for improvement, Ökoinstitut, 2007.
300. COM (2009) 630, p. 5.
301. See M. AMANN et alii, Emission scenarios for non-CO2 greenhouse gases in the EU-27 – Mitiga-
tion potentials and costs in 2020, IIASA, 2008.
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Anyway, whatever their level may be, these costs must of course be compared
with the costs of doing nothing, which could become much more important. If
the temperature rise goes beyond 2 degrees, it risks becoming uncontrollable.
This would represent a huge risk for costal zones, agricultural production, and
poor populations.
3. What will be the impact on the European Union?
The impact on the European Union will be substantial, and probably more in
the long term.
Firstly, climate change has become a brake in the drive to full market economy
that has characterized the world economy since the 1980s, even if the adoption
of the Kyoto protocol has paradoxically brought new market instruments in the
field of international environmental law. As the Stern review has quite strongly
– and correctly – emphasized, climate change is “the greatest market failure the
world has seen”303. This reality will thus inevitably stimulate the creation of
instruments to correct this failure.
In the EU, the fight against climate change is already provoking an adjustment
in the implementation of the single market rules. It requires more discrimination
between carbon and nocarbon energy, between heavy and light forms of energy
consumption. National regulations or taxations aiming in that direction will
probably benefit more in the future from the exceptions to the basic principles
established by the European treaties, as free movement or free competition. Sub-
sidies and tax exemptions with the same objectives will gain a new legitimacy.
A collateral damage could be that rules will most likely become more complex.
These tendencies can only be strengthened in the future. Whatever progress has
been accomplished since 1997, and however impressive the legal provisions,
either international or European, may appear, climate warming has accelerated.
The GHG emissions have not been stabilised. Consequently, substantially
harder efforts will be required during the next ten years everywhere, and thus in
the EU.
Secondly, the fight against climate change brings new legitimacy to the Euro-
pean Union. As a matter of fact, that topic has risen in ten years at the top of the
agenda of the European Council. Like most environmental problems, climate
303. http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/
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warming is a transnational problem in search of a transnational solution. It is a
domain where externalities are very strong, and thus where the EU measures
present a strong added value compared to national ones. Without any doubt, the
climate package increases in various aspects the integration between the Mem-
ber States, and thus the powers of the EU institutions. Whether it does this suf-
ficiently, considering the experience of the previous legislative framework, is
another question.
This new legitimacy can also be seen externally. The EU has played a fundamen-
tal role in the building of the international framework concerning climate
change, from the adoption of the UN 1992 convention on the protection of the
climate to the present negotiations about the future of the Kyoto system. This
has been one of the most significant initiatives of the EU at the international
level during the last 10 years.
4. Is the EU action sufficient?
This last question is especially tricky. First, it can be said that the question itself
is not appropriately formulated. Only a global effort may be sufficient to deal
with the climate warming threat. The essential lesson of the Copenhagen con-
ference is that the world is not ready for that, even if it has for the first time
officially taken note of the threat and of a general objective (to limit the growth
of temperature to 2°C).
Second, if one takes into consideration this objective to limit the growth of tem-
perature to 2°C, the result of the present EU measures is not sure at all. The
Commission itself has indicated that there was no certainty to reach it. On the
contrary, it indicated that there were only 50% chances. Furthermore, a 30%
reduction is absolutely necessary in that perspective, and the EU has not taken
this decision yet. Furthermore, the real efficiency of offset mechanisms does not
appear clearly yet, and it suffers presently from a growing criticism. It must also
be reminded that some previous action programs did not reach all their objec-
tives, for reasons often interesting to analyse.
Finally, a lot will depend on the execution. Firstly, the timing of the climate
package is very short. 2020 is not very far. This is especially the case considering
the very long time-length of most projects in the energy sector. Changing build-
ings and transport systems does not happen in one year (and sometimes not in
one decade). Secondly, the main texts of the climate package still require many
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Even if the EU action program reaches its objectives, the level of ambition in
other zones of the world remains quite modest. As a matter of fact, planet Earth
as a whole seems to slide into an accelerated climate change. On some aspects,
like the Arctic thaw, it seems now that things are going a lot quicker than
expected. This does not necessarily mean that temperatures will become unbear-
able quickly, since climate science remains a very uncertain one, but this evolu-
tion creates definitely an additional source of worry.
So, on one side, the EU action may still appear insufficient. However, on the
other side, it must be underlined that it has had until now a positive impact at
the global level. The EU played a fundamental role in the creation of the Kyoto
regime. The EU is the only regional zone in the world which has reduced its
GHG emissions since 1990. In the EU-27, the aggregated GHG emissions
dropped by 9.3% between 1990 and 2007. Comparatively, during the same
period, the USA’s emissions increased by 17%, and in Japan by 14%. This is no
trivial difference. Furthermore, the EU has been the first world power that has
proposed to deepen this reduction effort. This is not enough but, until now, this
remains the best offer on the global table. To conclude, the EU is most probably
not very advanced, but even so it remains a little bit more advanced than other
developed zones. Whether this is rather comforting or not is left to the reader’s
appreciation.